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ABSTRACT 
Claim preclusion bars parties from relitigating in a later action claims that were or should have been litigated in 
a prior action.  How does this doctrine apply in constitutional challenges to state and federal statutes?  When a 
plaintiff challenges one provision of a statute in one action, can she challenge a different provision of the same 
statute in a later action?  And when, if ever, can she bring two successive challenges to the same provision? 
Though the Supreme Court addressed these questions two terms ago in Whole Women’s Health v. Heller-
stedt, its answers were incomplete.  This Article searches for general principles guiding the Court’s decision and 
contextualizes them within broader theories of claim preclusion and constitutional adjudication.  First, it proposes 
that Hellerstedt heralds a rejection of the “transactional” approach—a fact-based analysis that poorly approx-
imates the relatedness of claims about the validity of statutory provisions.  To determine what kind of rule should 
take its place, the Article turns to an analysis of the policies motivating claim preclusion and a theory posited by 
two scholars regarding the proper “phrasing” of its doctrine.  Under this theory, the Article proposes, Hellerstedt 
establishes a narrow prima facie rule for claim preclusion in constitutional challenges to statutes: Only closely 
related provisions of a statute—i.e., those that impose interlocking requirements, serve similar functions, and take 
effect around the same time—need to be challenged together in a single action.  
The Article then asks whether courts’ prevailing approach to claim-preclusion exceptions—which gives judges 
wide discretion to evaluate the equities in particular cases—is likewise inappropriate for constitutional challenges, 
where the issues are often both more abstract and more politically charged than in ordinary civil litigation.  After 
concluding that it is, the Article proposes that courts fashion exceptions based instead on the structure of constitu-
tional doctrine, which, the Article demonstrates, interacts with claim preclusion’s underlying policies in predictable 
ways.  Finally, the Article argues that intervening factual developments should always give rise to a new constitu-
tional claim against the same statutory provision—regardless of whether the prior or subsequent challenge was 
facial or as-applied. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that the legislature in your state has just enacted a comprehen-
sive new gun-control statute.  The statute regulates the possession, purchase, 
and sale of guns; it bans guns in sensitive places, like schools, commercial 
areas, and government buildings; and it imposes special requirements for the 
possession of guns by minors, convicts, and the mentally ill.1  You, an avid 
gun enthusiast, believe that the statute violates your rights under the Second 
Amendment.  So, you file a lawsuit challenging the statute in federal court. 
	
 1 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008) (listing “presumptively lawful” gun 
regulations). 
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Assuming that you have Article III standing to challenge more than one 
of the statute’s provisions, which provisions would you challenge in your suit?  
Perhaps you would target the provisions that curtail the gun-related activities 
in which you participate most often.  Or perhaps you would target those that 
interfere with what you perceive to be the historical traditions of gun owner-
ship in the United States.  In any case, you probably wouldn’t worry about 
losing the right to challenge a provision of the statute by not challenging it in 
your first lawsuit.  After all, you might assume, you could always challenge 
that provision later, in a second suit. 
If you thought this, however, you could very well be wrong.  Under the 
doctrine of claim preclusion, a plaintiff may not assert the same claim against 
the same defendant twice in separate civil actions.2  For purposes of this doc-
trine, a plaintiff’s “claim” encompasses not just the matters that she actually 
litigated in a prior action, but also any other matters she should have litigated.3  
And although claim preclusion most often applies in disputes between private 
parties, it can also apply in constitutional challenges to statutes: After all, to 
challenge your state’s new gun-control statute, you would have to file a civil 
action against the government official responsible for enforcing it and ask the 
court for an injunction.  Thus, if you were to sue the same official twice, 
seeking an injunction against two different provisions of the statute, claim 
preclusion could bar your second challenge. 
How are you supposed to know what comprises your “claim” in a chal-
lenge to a statute?4  The Supreme Court addressed this question for the first 
time two terms ago in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt.5  The plaintiffs in that 
case, a group of abortion providers, first challenged a provision of a Texas 
statute—the “admitting-privileges” provision—as a facially unconstitutional 
“undue burden” on a woman’s right to have an abortion.6  After losing their 
first challenge, they challenged the provision again in a second action, except 
	
 2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (providing the general 
rules on the effects of former adjudication). 
 3 See id. § 24 (providing the “Dimensions of ‘Claim’ for Purposes of Merger or Bar”). 
 4 Throughout this Article, I use the term “challenge to a statute” as shorthand for a civil action in 
which a plaintiff sues a government official seeking a declaration that a statute, regulation, or other 
legal rule is invalid and an injunction should be issued against its enforcement.  I do not mean the 
term to encompass all of the ways in which a person might seek judicial review of a statute.  For 
example, after being charged with a crime, a defendant might raise as a defense the unconstitution-
ality of the statute he is alleged to have violated.  Because a defense generally does not trigger claim 
preclusion, this method of invoking judicial review is beyond the scope of this Article.  See 18 
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4414, at 371 (3d ed. 2016) (“[T]he traditional conclusion has been that purely de-
fensive use of a theory does not preclude a later action for affirmative recovery on the same the-
ory.”).  But see infra note 273 (listing some lower court decisions to the contrary). 
 5 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 6 Id. at 2300, 2304–05. 
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this time they argued that it was unconstitutional only as it applied to two 
specific abortion clinics.7  They also challenged another provision of the same 
statute—the “surgical-center provision”—for the first time.8 
The Supreme Court held that claim preclusion barred neither challenge.9  
According to the Court, the second challenge to the admitting-privileges pro-
vision was not the same “claim” as the first challenge because of “changed 
circumstances” between the two lawsuits—specifically, certain adverse effects 
that the plaintiffs had merely predicted in their first suit “ha[d] in fact occurred” by 
the time of their second suit.10  And the plaintiffs’ challenge to the surgical-
center provision was not the same “claim” as their earlier challenge to the 
admitting-privileges provision, because the two challenges targeted “separate, 
distinct” statutory provisions that imposed “independent requirements,” had 
“different enforcement dates,” and “serve[d] two different functions.”11 
The Court’s decision in Hellerstedt left many questions unanswered.  When 
are two provisions sufficiently “distinct” such that a challenge to one will not 
bar a later challenge to the other?  When are their “requirements” sufficiently 
“independent” or their “functions” sufficiently “different”?  And if a plaintiff 
decides to challenge the same provision twice, how can a court tell whether 
circumstances have “changed” enough to permit the second suit? 
Much hinges on the answers to these questions.  On the one hand, read-
ing Hellerstedt too narrowly would unnecessarily deprive prior plaintiffs of 
their rights to assert later constitutional challenges.  True, because claim pre-
clusion ordinarily applies only between the parties to a prior action,12 in 
many cases a new plaintiff will be able to assert whatever challenges the prior 
plaintiff forfeited, and claim preclusion will be of little practical consequence.  
But in other cases, finding a new plaintiff may be prohibitively difficult.  This 
might be the case where, for example, the statute applies only to a narrow 
class of persons, or where the prior action was a class action brought on be-
half of all persons affected by the statute. 
At the same time, too broad a definition would undermine the finality of 
judgments in constitutional challenges.13  Allowing the same plaintiff to assert 
similar constitutional challenges in separate actions would impose unneces-
sary costs on courts, which would have to consider similar facts and legal 
arguments in two separate proceedings.  It would also impose costs on the 
government, which may have justifiably assumed that the plaintiff did not 
intend to assert whatever challenges she omitted from her prior action.  
	
 7 Id. at 2307. 
 8 Id. at 2305, 2308–09. 
 9 Id.  
 10 Id. at 2306. 
 11 Id. at 2308. 
 12  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1982). 
 13 See infra Part I.A. 
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Though claim preclusion cannot ensure complete finality in constitutional 
litigation—because again, a new plaintiff could always assert whatever chal-
lenges the prior plaintiff lost—it can and should encourage a plaintiff to chal-
lenge a reasonable grouping of statutory provisions in her first lawsuit. 
Building on the factors identified by the Supreme Court in Hellerstedt, this 
Article proposes a more comprehensive theory of claim preclusion for chal-
lenges to statutes.  Part I begins by demonstrating that Hellerstedt’s approach 
does not fit with the prevailing modern theory of claim preclusion, the “trans-
actional” approach advanced by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.14  
Under this approach, a plaintiff’s claim consists of all of the rights, remedies, 
and theories of liability that arise out of the “common nucleus of operative 
facts” underlying her first action.15  Though this fact-based approach may be 
sensible for defining a plaintiff’s “claim” in an ordinary civil case, Part I ar-
gues, there is no coherent factual nucleus out of which a challenge to a statute 
can be said to “arise.”  Thus, Part I concludes, the transactional approach 
neither explains Hellerstedt nor helps courts think about claim preclusion 
problems in constitutional challenges. 
Fortunately, neither Hellerstedt nor any other authority requires courts to 
apply the transactional approach in constitutional challenges.  Part II takes a 
step back and asks what kind of approach should take its place.  Drawing on 
the “jurisprudence of rules and exceptions” for claim preclusion advanced 
by Professors Robert Casad and Kevin Clermont,16 this Part proposes that 
Hellerstedt be read as announcing a “clear, simple, and rigid” rule17: Closely 
related statutory provisions—those that impose interlocking “requirements,” 
serve similar “functions,”18 and take effect at roughly the same time—ought 
to be challenged together in a single action. 
Like all claim-preclusion rules, however, Hellerstedt’s broad rule should be 
tempered by flexible exceptions.  Particularly salient here, Part II argues, is 
the Restatement’s exception for when “it is the sense of [a constitutional] 
scheme that the plaintiff should be permitted to split his claim.”19  As written, 
Part II recognizes, this exception is too broadly phrased to be of much use to 
	
 14 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 1982). 
 15 As the Restatement (Second) of Judgments notes: 
What factual grouping constitutes a “transaction” . . . [is] to be determined pragmatically, 
giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, 
or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as 
a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage. 
  Id. § 24(2). 
 16 See ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS THEORY, 
DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 39–45 (2001). 
 17 Id. at 40. 
 18 Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2308 (2016). 
 19 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1982). 
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courts seeking to apply Hellerstedt’s rule for constitutional challenges.  To rem-
edy this problem, Part III draws on scholarship from various areas of consti-
tutional law to propose a more particularized set of exceptions to flesh out 
this broadly-phrased exception.  Finally, Part IV addresses successive chal-
lenges to the same statutory provision and argues that although Hellerstedt 
does not foreclose the application of claim preclusion to such challenges, its 
allowance for “changed circumstances” has a wider application than the de-
cision initially lets on. 
I.  CLAIM PRECLUSION IN CHALLENGES TO STATUTES   
A.  Claim Preclusion and the “Transactional” Approach 
Claim preclusion, like the related doctrine of issue preclusion, is an aspect 
of res judicata, a body of rules that prohibits the relitigation of matters that 
either were or should have been litigated in a prior action.20  Though in the-
ory, res judicata’s constituent rules could be set by statute or even by the 
Constitution,21 in most U.S. jurisdictions (including the federal courts), courts 
fashion the rules as a matter of common law.22  As a result, res judicata is a 
flexible doctrine that courts routinely revise in response to new, policy-driven 
considerations.23  
 The purpose of res judicata is to promote the finality of judgments.24  
This finality is advantageous to both the parties to a given lawsuit and to the 
public at large.25  From the public’s perspective, finality reduces the risk of 
inconsistent judicial decisions, which would undermine the public’s faith in 
the courts.  It also reduces the risk of redundant litigation, which is wasteful 
not only of the parties’ resources, but also the judiciary’s.  From the parties’ 
perspective, finality creates a sense of repose—an assurance that, after a mat-
ter has been litigated once, the parties can consider it settled and adjust their 
real-world dealings accordingly.  Finality also makes it more difficult for ei-
ther party to intentionally vex the other with repetitive litigation.26 
	
 20 See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 4, § 4403, at 17, 25–26. 
 21 Both the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 require that the court 
of one state accord the judgment of a sister state the same preclusive effect that it would accord one 
of its own judgments—that is, that it apply at least its own rules of res judicata to a sister-state 
judgment.  See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  28 U.S.C. § 1738 requires that a federal court also provide 
such preclusive effect to a state-court judgment. 
 22 CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 16, at 5–6; see also Semtek Int’l v. Lockheed Martin, 531 U.S. 497, 
508 (2001) (characterizing federal claim-preclusion rules as “federal common law”). 
 23 CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 16, at 6. 
 24  WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 4, § 4403, at 26. 
 25 Id. 
 26  Id. 
	
Dec. 2017] IDENTITY CRISIS 377 
Claim preclusion is a defense to a claim.27  It bars recovery on the claim 
against which it is asserted if three elements are met: (1) the party asserting 
the claim (i.e., the plaintiff) and the party asserting preclusion (i.e., the de-
fendant) were both parties to a prior action; (2) the court entered a “valid and 
final” judgment in that action;28 and (3) the claim is the “same” as a claim 
that the plaintiff asserted against the defendant in the previous action.29  The 
third element—the “identity” of claims30—is often the most difficult to apply, 
and is the focus of our inquiry here. 
To determine whether two claims are “the same,” most courts today31 
follow the “transactional” approach laid out in the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments: “When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extin-
guishes the plaintiff’s claim . . . , the claim extinguished includes all rights of 
the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part 
of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action 
arose.”32  The “transaction” out of which an action “arises” is the “natural 
grouping or common nucleus of operative facts” underlying the plaintiff’s 
claims in that action.33  “What factual grouping constitutes a ‘transaction,’” 
	
 27 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (listing res judicata as a defense that must be asserted in a responsive 
pleading). 
 28 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 1–12 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (setting out validity’s 
three requirements of notice, territorial jurisdiction, and subject-matter jurisdiction); id. § 13 (dis-
cussing finality). 
 29 See id. § 18 (“When a valid and final personal judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff . . . [t]he 
plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain an action on the original claim or any part thereof.”); id. § 19 
(“A valid and final personal judgment rendered in favor of the defendant bars another action by 
the plaintiff on the same claim.”). 
 30 See, e.g., Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 673 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1077 
(9th Cir. 2003)) (using four factors to determine the “identity of claims” to decide whether claim 
preclusion applies). 
 31 Though many jurisdictions today follow the Restatement’s approach, some still follow older ap-
proaches.  The Restatement summarizes these approaches: Some courts define a claim as “a single 
theory of recovery, so that . . . a plaintiff might have as many claims as there were theories of the 
substantive law upon which he could seek relief against the defendant.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1982).  Others define a claim as “a single primary right 
as accorded by the substantive law, so that, if it appeared that the defendant had invaded a number 
of primary rights conceived to be held by the plaintiff, the plaintiff had the same number of claims, 
even though they all sprang from a unitary occurrence.”  Id.  Still others “look[ ] to sameness of 
evidence; a second action [i]s precluded where the evidence to support it [i]s the same as that 
needed to support the first.”  Id.  Because modern rules on pleading, joinder, and amendment make 
it easy to litigate related matters together in one action, the transactional approach “reflects the 
expectation that parties who are given the capacity to present their ‘entire controversies’ shall in 
fact do so.”  Id.  For an argument that this rule is too harsh even in the context of ordinary civil 
litigation, see Edward W. Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 347 (1948) (arguing that 
res judicata “applies too harsh a penalty”). 
 32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (emphasis added). 
 33 Id. § 24(2) cmt. b.  Examples of a “transaction” might include a business deal in a contract case, id. 
§ 24 cmt. c, illus. 3, a car accident in a tort case, id. § 24 cmt. c, illus. 1–2, or an employer–employee 
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the Restatement continues, “[is] to be determined pragmatically, giving 
weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, 
origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether 
their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business 
understanding or usage.”34  Thus, two claims can be “the same” for purposes 
of claim preclusion even though they allege different harms, assert different 
substantive theories of liability, or seek different kinds of relief.35 
In addition to this broad prima facie rule, claim preclusion is subject to a 
number of narrow exceptions.36  For example, if the prior judgment specified 
that it was “without prejudice” or if the parties agreed that the judgment 
would not preclude a particular claim, a later court will not treat the judg-
ment as preclusive.37  Likewise, if the plaintiff could not have asserted one of 
the claims in a prior action because of a limitation on the prior court’s sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction, claim preclusion will not apply.38  Inferences drawn 
from the applicable substantive law can also defeat claim preclusion; thus, 
for example, if “[t]he judgment in the first action was plainly inconsistent 
with the fair and equitable implementation of a statutory or constitutional 
scheme, or it is the sense of the scheme that the plaintiff should be permitted 
to split his claim,” then preclusion will not apply.39  Even in the absence of 
such a scheme (such as in a contract or tort action), the same is true if “rea-
sons of substantive policy” so counsel.40  
Thus, the transactional approach aims to strike a balance between “[t]he 
desire to achieve efficiency and repose” and “the fear of forfeiting just 
claims.”41  Perhaps because of this balance, most federal courts and many 
state courts have adopted the transactional approach as their own.42 
	
relationship.  See, e.g., Wilkes v. Wyo. Dep’t of Emp’t, 314 F.3d 501, 504 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“This court repeatedly has held that all claims arising from the same 
employment relationship constitute the same transaction or series of transactions for claim-preclu-
sion purposes.”).  
 34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1982). 
 35 Id. § 25. 
 36 See id. § 20 (providing exceptions to the general rule of bar); id. § 26(1) (providing exceptions to the 
general rule against claim splitting). 
 37 See id. § 26(1)(a)–(b), cmts. a–b (providing exceptions to § 24 extinguishment of claims). 
 38 See id. § 26(1)(c), cmt. c (contextualizing the exceptions to § 24 extinguishment of claims). 
 39 Id. § 26(1)(d) cmt. e. 
 40 See id. § 26(1)(e) cmts. f–h.  
 41 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 4, § 4407, at 173; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (“[U]nderlying the [transactional] standard is the 
need to strike a delicate balance between, on the one hand, the interests of the defendant and of the 
courts in bringing litigation to a close and, on the other, the interest of the plaintiff in the vindication 
of a just claim.”). 
 42 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 4, § 4407, at 175 n.22, 185 n.44 (listing federal and state 
courts that have adopted the transactional approach).  
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B.  The Claim Preclusion Problems in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt 
The Supreme Court recently considered how the doctrine of claim pre-
clusion applies in constitutional challenges to statutes in Whole Women’s Health 
v. Hellerstedt.43  That case was the second of two challenges brought by a group 
of Texas abortion providers to House Bill 2 (“H.B. 2”),44 a 2013 Texas statute 
that regulates abortion providers. 
In their first action, filed a few months after H.B. 2 was enacted but before 
it took effect,45 the plaintiffs challenged a provision of the statute that required 
all abortion providers to have “admitting privileges” at a nearby hospital.46  A 
doctor with admitting privileges is a member of a hospital’s staff and can, at 
least in theory, continue providing inpatient care to a patient even after she is 
hospitalized.47  According to Texas, the purpose of the admitting-privileges 
provision was to ensure continuity of care and enhance physician communi-
cation in the event that the abortion of a woman’s pregnancy required hospi-
talization.48  It also served a credentialing function, as hospitals were less likely 
to grant admitting privileges to poorly qualified physicians.49 
The plaintiffs countered that abortions almost never required hospitaliza-
tion, and that in any case, Texas had pointed to no examples where a woman 
was actually harmed because of a miscommunication between her abortion 
provider and her emergency-room physician.50  Moreover, because hospitals 
	
 43 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 44 H.B. 2, 83d Leg., 2d Sess. (Tex. 2013). 
 45 Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott I), 951 F. Supp. 2d 
891, 896 (W.D. Tex. 2013), rev’d in part by Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health 
Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott II), 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 46 See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2310 (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a)) 
(providing that “[a] physician performing or inducing an abortion . . . must . . . have active admit-
ting privileges at a hospital that . . . is located not further than 30 miles from the location at which 
the abortion is performed or induced”). 
 47 See Brief for Petitioner at 19, Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 
15-274), 2015 WL 9592289, at *19 (describing hospital admitting privileges in general terms).  A 
doctor without admitting privileges, by contrast, must “hand off” a patient who requires hospitali-
zation to a member of the hospital’s staff.  Abbott I, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 899.  In most cases, however, 
a patient experiencing complications from an abortion would seek admission at the hospital nearest 
to her and would receive care from an emergency-room physician who would communicate with 
the patient’s outpatient physician—even if her outpatient physician has admitting privileges at the 
hospital.  Id. at 900.  Federal law requires hospitals to admit a patient who needs emergency care, 
regardless of whether her outpatient doctors has admitting privileges.  Id. at 899–900 (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988)). 
 48 Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 592. 
 49 Id. (explaining that the State defended the provision as a means of “ensur[ing] that only physicians 
‘credentialed and board certified to perform procedures generally recognized within the scope of 
their medical training and competence’ would provide abortions” and “to ‘screen out’ untrained 
and incompetent abortion providers, who could not continue in the abortion practice if they were 
not able to obtain admitting privileges”). 
 50 Id. at 590–91; see also Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2311–12 (noting Texas’s lack of evidence on this point); 
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usually condition the granting of admitting privileges on the number of pa-
tients a doctor admits, and because abortions so seldom require hospitaliza-
tion, admitting privileges would be especially difficult for abortion providers 
to obtain, and many clinics would have to close if the admitting-privileges 
provision were to take effect.51  Thus, the plaintiffs contended, given its mar-
ginal safety benefits, the admitting-privileges provision was an unconstitu-
tional “undue burden” on the right of Texas women to have an abortion.52 
The district court agreed and enjoined the enforcement of the provision, 
but the Fifth Circuit reversed.53  Unpersuaded of the difficulties that abortion 
providers would face in obtaining the requisite admitting privileges, the court 
held that the provision passed constitutional muster.54  The plaintiffs did not 
petition for certiorari, and the admitting-privileges provision took effect.55 
One week later, the same plaintiffs56 filed a second action challenging the 
admitting-privileges provision again.  This time, however, they challenged it 
only insofar as it applied to two specific clinics,57 alleging that since the filing 
of their first lawsuit, the doctors at those two clinics had in fact been unable 
to obtain the required admitting privileges and that as a result, the clinics 
would soon have to close.58  The plaintiffs also challenged a different provi-
sion of H.B. 2, which required abortion clinics to meet the same physical 
plant requirements as “ambulatory surgical centers”—facilities that perform 
surgeries but do not provide inpatient (i.e., overnight) care.59  Because abor-
	
id. at 2320 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that doctors without admitting privileges at a local 
hospital could perform plenty of more dangerous surgical procedures—including childbirth). 
 51 Abbott I, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 900. 
 52 Id.  
 53 Id. at 901; Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 600. 
 54 Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 597–600. 
 55 See Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 577 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2301 (2016) (“The time for seeking certi-
orari from the United States Supreme Court passed, and no petition was filed.”). 
 56 The plaintiffs in the second suit were not all the same, but the two groups of plaintiffs “largely 
overlap[ped].”  Cole, 790 F.3d at 577 n.14. 
 57 Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2301.  
 58 Id.; see also Cole, 790 F.3d at 591 (“We now know with certainty that the non-ASC abortion facilities 
have actually closed and physicians have been unable to obtain admitting privileges after diligent 
effort.”). 
 59 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 243.002 (West 2015) (“‘Ambulatory surgical center’ means 
a facility that operates primarily to provide surgical services to patients who do not require overnight 
hospital care.”); Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (providing that “the minimum standards for an abortion 
facility must be equivalent to the minimum standards adopted under [the Texas Health and Safety 
Code] for ambulatory surgical centers” (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(a))).  
These requirements included: “scrub facilities; maintaining a one-way traffic pattern through the fa-
cility; having ceiling, wall, and floor finishes; separating soiled utility and sterilization rooms; and reg-
ulating air pressure, filtration, and humidity control.”  The costs of complying with these requirements 
would “rang[e] from $1 million . . . to $3 million per facility.”  Id. at 2315–16, 2318. 
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tions could be performed safely without these expensive physical modifica-
tions, the plaintiffs claimed, the surgical-center requirement was also an “un-
due burden” on abortion rights.60  Again, the district court agreed and en-
joined the enforcement of both provisions.61 
The Fifth Circuit reversed in part, holding that claim preclusion barred 
the challenge to the surgical-center provision but not the admitting-privileges 
provision.62  The challenge to the surgical-center provision, the court ex-
plained, was barred because it “ar[o]se from the same transaction” as the 
plaintiffs’ earlier challenge to the admitting-privileges requirement.63  This 
was so because the two provisions were “enacted at the same time as part of 
the same act,” “motivated by a common purpose,” and “administered by the 
same state officials.”64  The second challenge to the admitting-privileges pro-
vision, however, was permissible because it was an as-applied challenge (i.e., 
to only two clinics), whereas the prior challenge was a facial challenge.65 
In a 5-3 opinion by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth 
Circuit in part, holding that neither claim was barred by claim preclusion.66  
First, the Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that although the plaintiffs had 
challenged the admitting-privileges requirement twice in two separate law-
suits, their “preenforcement facial challenge” was not the same “claim” as 
their “postenforcement as-applied challenge.”67  This was because their sec-
ond challenge relied on “later, concrete factual developments” that were 
“unknowable before [H.B. 2] went into effect”—specifically, the difficulty of 
obtaining admitting privileges for abortion providers at two clinics and the 
consequent imminent closure of those clinics.68  As support for this conclu-
sion, the Court cited the Second Restatement’s position “that development 
of new material facts can mean that a new case and an otherwise similar 
previous case do not present the same claim.”69  It also gave the hypothetical 
	
 60 Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2300. 
 61 Id. at 2301. 
 62 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s injunction against the application of the admitting-
privileges requirement to the McAllen clinic, because it found that there was no other facility within 
a reasonable distance where women in the Rio Grande Valley could obtain an abortion.  Cole, 790 
F.3d at 592–96.  It reversed the injunction as to the El Paso clinic, however, because women in El 
Paso could travel to an abortion clinic only twelve miles away.  Id. at 596–98.  And it reversed the 
statewide injunction as foreclosed by claim preclusion.  Id. at 581. 
 63 Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2303 (citing Cole, 790 F.3d at 581–83). 
 64 Id. at 2307 (quoting Cole, 790 F.3d at 581). 
 65 Cole, 790 F.3d at 592. 
 66 Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2304–05, 2309. 
 67 Id. at 2305. 
 68 Id. at 2306. 
 69  Id. at 2305 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1982)) 
(stating that “[m]aterial operative facts occurring after the decision of an action with respect to the 
same subject matter may in themselves, or taken in conjunction with the antecedent facts, comprise 
a transaction which may be made the basis of a second action not precluded by the first”).  
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example of “a group of prisoners who claim that they are being forced to 
drink contaminated water”:  
[Suppose that] [t]hese prisoners file suit against the facility where they are 
incarcerated.  If at first their suit is dismissed because a court does not believe 
that the harm would be severe enough to be unconstitutional, it would make 
no sense to prevent the same prisoners from bringing a later suit if time and 
experience eventually showed that prisoners were dying from contaminated 
water. . . . Factual developments may show that constitutional harm, which 
seemed too remote or speculative to afford relief at the time of an earlier suit, 
was in fact indisputable.  In our view, such changed circumstances will give 
rise to a new constitutional claim.70 
Thus, the Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that the plaintiffs’ as-applied chal-
lenge to the admitting-privileges provision was not barred by claim preclusion. 
But the Court disagreed that the plaintiffs’ challenge to the surgical-center 
provision was barred because it could have been brought in their first action.  
After setting out the passage from the Fifth Circuit’s opinion that explained 
why the plaintiffs’ challenges to the two provisions arose out of the same 
“transaction,”71 the Supreme Court explained that the Fifth Circuit had failed 
“to take account of meaningful differences” between the two provisions: 
The surgical-center provision and the admitting-privileges provision are sep-
arate, distinct provisions of H.B. 2.  They set forth two different, independent 
requirements with different enforcement dates.  This Court has never sug-
gested that challenges to two different statutory provisions that serve two 
different functions must be brought in a single suit.  And lower courts nor-
mally treat challenges to distinct regulatory requirements as “separate 
claims,” even when they are part of one overarching “[g]overnment regula-
tory scheme.”72 
“That approach makes sense,” the Court continued, because the Fifth 
Circuit’s approach  
would require treating every statutory enactment as a single transaction 
which a given party would only be able to challenge one time, in one lawsuit, 
in order to avoid the effects of claim preclusion.  Such a rule would encourage 
a kitchen-sink approach to any litigation challenging the validity of statutes.  
That outcome is less than optimal—not only for litigants, but for courts.73 
	
 70 Id. at 2305. 
 71 See supra text accompanying notes 62–64. 
 72 Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2308 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).  
 73 Id.  The Court also pointed to several “other good reasons why [the plaintiffs] should not have had 
to bring their challenge to the surgical-center provision at the same time they brought their first 
suit.”  Id.  For one thing, at the time of the plaintiffs’ first suit, the Texas agency responsible for 
administering the surgical-center provision had not yet issued rules implementing the provision, 
and given that “more than three quarters” of then-existing surgical centers had been granted full 
or partial waivers of those requirements, the plaintiffs “might well have expected” that they would 
receive comparable exemptions and that litigation would be unnecessary.  Id.  Moreover, “the rel-
evant factual circumstances” changed between the plaintiffs’ two suits, as the Court noted in its 
discussion of the admitting-privileges provision.  Id. 
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Thus, the Court concluded, neither the plaintiffs’ challenge to the surgical-
center provision nor their second challenge to the admitting-privileges pro-
vision was barred by claim preclusion. 
 Having disposed of the claim-preclusion issue, the Court proceeded to 
the merits of the case.  The admitting-privileges requirement, the Court held, 
offered few “medical benefits” because “[t]he great weight of evidence 
demonstrates that, before the act’s passage, abortion in Texas was extremely 
safe,” and thus “there was no significant health-related problem that the new 
law helped to cure.”74  By contrast, it placed a “substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman[ ]” seeking an abortion, especially because admitting priv-
ileges are difficult for abortion providers to obtain.75  Likewise, the Court 
held that although the physical specifications made applicable to abortion 
clinics through the surgical-center provision made sense as applied to outpa-
tient clinics that actually performed surgeries, they had “such a tangential 
relationship to patient safety in the context of abortion as to be nearly arbi-
trary.”76  The surgical-center requirement therefore lacked sufficient medical 
benefits to justify its costs, and it too amounted to an undue burden. 
The three dissenting justices disagreed with the Court both on claim pre-
clusion and on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, but they concentrated their 
fire on the former issue.  Echoing commentators’ cries of “abortion distor-
tion,”77 Justice Alito wrote for the dissenters that “[u]nder the rules that ap-
ply in regular cases, petitioners could not relitigate the exact same claim in a 
second suit. . . . In this abortion case, however, that rule is disregarded.”78  
 Though Justice Alito expressed skepticism as to whether the Restate-
ment’s transactional approach was the correct one to apply to the plaintiffs’ 
constitutional challenge, he nonetheless went through the motions of apply-
ing it.79  “[T]he ‘operative fact’ in the prior case,” Justice Alito wrote, “was 
the enactment of the admitting privileges requirement.”80  Because “that is 
	
 74 Id. at 2311. 
 75 Id. at 2312–13. 
 76 Id. at 2316 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 684 (W.D. Tex. 2014), 
vacated by Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 833 F.3d 565 (5th Cir. 2016)). 
 77 “Abortion distortion” is a term coined by conservative commentators to describe the purported 
phenomenon whereby liberal judges allegedly disregard ordinary legal rules—both substantive and 
procedural—to reach pro-choice results in abortion cases.  See, e.g., Jay Sekulow, Supreme Court’s 
Abortion Distortion Puts Women at Risk, FOX NEWS (June 27, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/opin-
ion/2016/06/27/supreme-courts-abortion-distortion-puts-women-at-risk.html; Travis Weber, 
“Abortion Distortion” at Work in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, FAM. RES. COUNCIL (June 
28, 2016), http://www.frcblog.com/2016/06/abortion-distortion-work-whole-womans-health-v-
hellerstedt/. 
 78 Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 79  Justice Alito’s dissent criticized the majority for “simply assum[ing] that we should follow the second 
Restatement . . . .”  Id. at 2332.  
 80  Id. at 2334. 
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precisely the same operative fact underlying petitioners’ facial attack [to the 
admitting-privileges requirement] in the case now before us,” the plaintiffs’ 
admitting-privileges challenge was barred.81  And because the surgical-center 
provision was also part of the same enactment as the admitting-privileges 
provision, it too should have been barred.82  Under the transactional ap-
proach, therefore—at least when correctly applied—none of the plaintiffs’ 
claims should have survived. 
 
* * * 
 
Hellerstedt’s discussion of claim preclusion in constitutional challenges 
leaves many questions unanswered.  Does the Restatement’s transactional ap-
proach survive for cases where a plaintiff challenges two provisions of a statute 
in separate actions, or does some other rule apply?  We know that a preen-
forcement facial challenge does not preclude a later postenforcement as-ap-
plied challenge to the same statute, at least as long as there are “changed cir-
cumstances” between the two suits.  But why?  Are there any other situations 
where a plaintiff can challenge the same provision of the same statute twice?  
The remainder of this Article seeks out answers to these questions.  Part II 
begins with the first question: What rule governs successive challenges to re-
lated provisions of a statute after Hellerstedt?  Drawing on existing scholarship 
on facial and as-applied challenges and the structure of constitutional doctrine, 
Part III considers what sort of exceptions courts should recognize in this area.  
Part IV then returns to the question of when challenges to the same provision 
of the same statute ought to be allowed and seeks to explain Hellerstedt’s holding 
on this point within the broader context of claim-preclusion doctrine. 
II.  SUCCESSIVE CHALLENGES TO RELATED PROVISIONS  
OF A STATUTE: THE RULE 
A.  The Transactional Approach  
As noted already, the Restatement’s transactional approach is the pre-
vailing modern approach to claim preclusion in U.S. jurisdictions.83  In seek-
ing to extract a rule from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hellerstedt, there-
fore, a natural first question is whether the Court endorsed the transactional 
approach for challenges to statutes. 
	
 81  Id. at 2340. 
 82  Id. at 2334. 
 83 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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Answering this question proves surprisingly difficult.  Though a cursory 
reading might suggest that the opinion embraced the transactional ap-
proach—indeed, Justice Alito’s dissent criticized the majority for adopting 
the transactional approach sub silentio—a close reading of the opinion reveals 
that the Court in fact carefully avoided either adopting or rejecting that ap-
proach.  Thus, the question remains an open one. 
For example, in its discussion of the plaintiffs’ challenge to the surgical-
center provision, the Court began by quoting at length the Fifth Circuit’s 
conclusion that the challenge “ar[o]se from the same transaction or series of 
connected transactions” as their challenge to the admitting-privileges provi-
sion.84  But instead of addressing whether the Fifth Circuit was correct to 
apply a transactional analysis, the Court simply said that the Fifth Circuit 
had erred because it had failed to account for “meaningful differences” be-
tween the two provisions, which it then proceeded to enumerate.85  Likewise, 
in its discussion of the admitting-privileges provision, the Court cited in a 
parenthetical a comment to the Restatement which states that “[m]aterial 
operative facts occurring after the decision of an action with respect to the 
same subject matter may . . . comprise a transaction which may be made the 
basis of a second action not precluded by the first.”86  But the proposition for 
which the Court cited the comment was that “development of new material 
facts can mean that a new case and an otherwise similar previous case do not 
present the same claim”—the Court never actually stated that the two chal-
lenges arise out of different transactions.87  Indeed, the Court conspicuously 
avoided using the word “transaction” throughout its opinion—the word ap-
pears outside of quotation marks only once, in a passage that criticizes the 
Fifth Circuit’s own application of the transactional approach.88  
	
 84  Specifically, the Court wrote: 
The [Fifth Circuit] explained that petitioners' constitutional challenge to the surgical-cen-
ter requirement and the challenge to the admitting-privileges requirement mounted in Ab-
bott “arise from the same ‘transaction or series of connected transactions.’ . . . The chal-
lenges involve the same parties and abortion facilities; the challenges are governed by the 
same legal standards; the provisions at issue were enacted at the same time as part of the 
same act; the provisions were motivated by a common purpose; the provisions are admin-
istered by the same state officials; and the challenges form a convenient trial unit because 
they rely on a common nucleus of operative facts.”  
  Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2307 (quoting Whole Women’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 581 (5th Cir. 
2015)). 
 85  Id. at 2308. 
 86 Id. at 2305 (emphasis added). 
 87  Id. at 2305 (emphasis added) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. f (AM. 
LAW. INST. 1982)). 
 88  Id. at 2308 (“The opposite approach adopted by the Court of Appeals would require treating every 
statutory enactment as a single transaction which a given party would only be able to challenge one 
time, in one lawsuit, in order to avoid the effects of claim preclusion.”). 
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 Given that both the Fifth Circuit and the dissent explicitly applied the 
transactional approach to the plaintiffs’ claims, the Court’s care to avoid en-
dorsing that approach cannot be dismissed as an oversight.  Whether the 
transactional approach applies remains an open question.  
But if the transactional approach does apply, then what is the “transac-
tion” out of which a challenge to a statute arises?  Was Justice Alito right to 
agree with the Fifth Circuit that, assuming arguendo that the transactional ap-
proach applies, the relevant “transaction” would be the enactment of the chal-
lenged statute?89  Though the Supreme Court ultimately rejected this defini-
tion of the transaction, Justice Alito’s analysis provides a useful starting point.  
1.  Possible “Transactions” in a Challenge to a Statutory Provision  
a.  The Enactment of the Challenged Statute 
Initially, Justice Alito’s definition of the relevant “transaction”—the enact-
ment of the challenged statute—is attractive.  One can easily imagine the leg-
islative process leading up to a statute’s enactment as a “natural grouping” of 
facts that are “related in time, space, origin, [and] motivation” and would form 
a “convenient trial unit.”90  Such facts might include committee reports on the 
proposed legislation, statements made by legislators during floor debates, the 
legislature’s factual findings, and prior drafts or proposed amendments. 
But the Hellerstedt Court rejected this approach, and for good reason.  Re-
call that under the transactional approach, all claims arising out of the same 
“transaction” as a previously litigated claim are barred in a later action, re-
gardless of whether they state different legal theories, involve different evi-
dence, or seek different relief.91  Thus, if the “transaction” in a challenge to 
a statutory provision is the enactment of the statute in which the provision 
appears, then a challenge to one provision of a statute would preclude a sub-
sequent challenge to any other provision that appears in the same enactment.  
As the Hellerstedt Court observed, this would be impractical: 
Such a rule would encourage a kitchen-sink approach to any litigation chal-
lenging the validity of statutes.  That outcome is less than optimal—not only 
for litigants, but for courts. . . . Statutes are often voluminous, with many re-
lated, yet distinct, provisions.  Plaintiffs, in order to preserve their claims, need 
not challenge each such provision of, say, the USA PATRIOT Act, the Bipar-
tisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, the National Labor Relations Act, the 
	
 89  See id. at 2333–34 (Alito, J., dissenting) (highlighting the admitting-privileges requirement); id. at 
2340 (noting the surgical-center requirement). 
 90 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2) cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 1982). 
 91 See id. § 25 (stating that § 24 extinguishes a plaintiff’s claim even though the plaintiff “is prepared in 
the second action to present evidence or grounds or theories of the case not presented in the first 
action, or to seek remedies or forms of relief not demanded in the first action”).  
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Clean Water Act, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
or the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in their first lawsuit.92 
Moreover, the enactment-as-transaction theory is also underinclusive in 
important ways.  If the “transaction” is the enactment of a statute, then a 
plaintiff who challenges a provision of one statute need not also challenge 
other provisions of statutes enacted at different times—even if those other 
rules are “closely related” to the challenged rule.  But why should this be? 
Assume, for example, that one year after passing H.B. 2, a new Texas 
legislature passed a law requiring abortion facilities to intermittently undergo 
state inspections for compliance with H.B. 2’s surgical-center requirement.  
Under Justice Alito’s approach, a challenge to the surgical-center require-
ment would preclude a later challenge to the admitting-privileges require-
ment, but not the inspection requirement, because the two provisions did not 
arise out of the same enactment.  Yet the inspection requirement is more 
closely related to the surgical-center requirement than the admitting-privi-
leges requirement.  This makes little sense in terms of judicial efficiency, re-
pose, or any of the other interests that claim preclusion seeks to promote. 
In sum, the enactment-as-transaction theory has all the hallmarks of a 
too-broad theory of claim preclusion.  It would “increase litigation of matters 
that otherwise would be forgotten or forgiven” and punish plaintiffs for “jus-
tifiable omissions,”93 all while only halfheartedly serving the interests of judi-
cial efficiency and repose.  Thus, the Hellerstedt Court rightly rejected the sug-
gestion—made by both the Fifth Circuit and the dissenters—that the 
enactment of a statute is the transaction out of which a constitutional claim 
against that statute arises. 
	
 92 Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2308–09.  Indeed, H.B. 2 itself contained numerous requirements not chal-
lenged by the plaintiffs in Hellerstedt.  See, e.g., H.B. 2, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Tex. 2013) (prohib-
iting abortions after twenty weeks, subject to certain exceptions, and regulating the distribution of 
“abortion-inducing drugs”); id. § 5 (imposing additional reporting requirements on abortion pro-
viders); id. § 6 (providing for the revocation of a doctor’s occupational license for failure to comply 
with § 3); id. § 9 (providing that nothing in H.B. 2 should be construed as repealing “any other 
provision of Texas law regulating or restricting abortion not specifically addressed by this Act”). 
In his dissent, Justice Alto seemed to acknowledge the breadth of his proposal and sought to 
avoid it by allowing for a “relatedness” requirement.  Id. at 2341 (Alito, J., dissenting) (agreeing with 
the majority “that we should not ‘encourage a kitchen-sink approach to any litigation challenging 
the validity of statutes’” but arguing “that is not the situation in this case,” in part because “[t]he two 
claims here are very closely related”).  This “relatedness” requirement flies in the face of the transac-
tional approach, however, whose value lies in its categorical effect: Once a claim arises out of the 
same “transaction”—here, the enactment—it is barred, regardless of how “unrelated” it may be to 
the prior claim.  The dissent did not explain how to tell whether any given set of rules are “closely 
related” enough to constitute the same claim.  Indeed, the only apparent difference between the 
dissent’s “closely-related” test and the majority’s “different-functions” test, see id. at 2308 (majority 
opinion), is that the statutory provisions at issue in Hellerstedt flunked the former and passed the latter.  
 93 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 4, § 4407, at 168. 
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b.  The Injury to the Plaintiff 
Justice Alito’s dissent in Hellerstedt also considered another possible “trans-
action” out of which the plaintiffs’ first challenge to the admitting-privileges 
requirement might have arisen: the “actual clinic closures” that were about 
to occur because of that requirement.94  Although Justice Alito was somewhat 
dismissive of this option,95 the “likely or actual effects” of a statute’s enforce-
ment are in fact a promising candidate for the transaction in a challenge to 
a statute.  This is because in most cases, a statute’s effects will form a “natural 
grouping” of facts that are related in “time, space, origin, or motivation” and 
hence make up “a convenient unit for trial purposes.”96 
One problem with this proposal is that only some substantive constitu-
tional doctrines—including the “undue burden” test applied in Hellerstedt—
evaluate statutes based on their real-world effects.  Other doctrines evaluate 
statutes based on their relationship to legitimate state interests, the processes 
by which they were enacted, or simply their text and semantic content.97  It 
would seem anomalous to consider a statute’s real-world effects as the “trans-
action” underlying a challenge when the outcome of that challenge has little 
or nothing to do with those effects. 
There is another sense, however, in which a challenge to a statute must 
“arise out of” the statute’s effects on the challenger: A plaintiff must always 
assert that a statute has injured her (or will injure her) to establish her Article 
III standing.98   The requirement of Article III standing is jurisdictional, 
moreover, so no constitutional challenge may proceed without it.99 
	
 94 Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2334 n.3 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 95 Id. at 2340. 
 96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGEMENTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).  
 97 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 57 (1997) 
[hereinafter Fallon, Implementing the Constitution] (giving a more detailed discussion of these types of 
tests); see also infra Part III.B (discussing the relationship between claim preclusion and different types 
of doctrinal tests). 
 98 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (explaining that “standing is an essen-
tial . . . part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III,” and that standing entails an “in-
jury in fact” and “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of”).  In 
some cases, the plaintiff satisfies this requirement by showing that the law could be applied to her 
because of conduct in which she is engaged or regularly engages.  See, e.g., Abbott II, 748 F.3d 583, 
589 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Here, the requirements for third-party standing are met in relation to the 
claims asserted by the physician-plaintiffs on behalf of their patients because[,] [inter alia,] the phy-
sicians face potential administrative and criminal penalties for failing to comply with H.B. 2.”).  
Alternatively, a plaintiff could satisfy the injury requirement by showing that a law’s application to 
others will have adverse effects on her.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–64 (recognizing that “[t]he desire to 
use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable 
interest for purpose of standing,” such that a plaintiff could in theory challenge regulatory action 
that did not impose legal obligations on her but rather damaged environmental areas which the 
plaintiff had “concrete plans” to visit). 
 99 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559–60 (explaining that Article III “limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to 
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To determine the “transaction” underlying a prior constitutional chal-
lenge, a court could look to the “injury” that the plaintiff alleged for standing 
purposes.  This injury might include an enforcement action against the plain-
tiff;100 the detriment that the plaintiff has suffered by coming into compliance 
with the law; or, if the plaintiff has not yet complied, the detriment that she 
would suffer if she were to comply.101  If two provisions threaten the same 
injury but the plaintiff challenges only one of them in her first action, then 
claim preclusion would bar a later challenge to the provision that she initially 
decided not to challenge. 
The problem with this theory is that again, in many cases, a single “in-
jury” could give a plaintiff standing to challenge a great many provisions of 
a statute.  Imagine a case with the same facts as Hellerstedt, except that a group 
of Texas women brought the two challenges, instead of a group of Texas 
abortion providers.  The women’s standing would derive from the fact that 
the admitting-privileges and surgical-center provisions injured them by im-
peding their access to abortions.102  But nearly every other provision of H.B. 
2—whose formal title, after all, was “an act relating to the regulation of abor-
tion procedures, providers, and facilities”—would also make it more difficult 
for Texas women to obtain abortions.103  Because the question would be not 
	
‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’” and that “the core component of standing is an essential and unchang-
ing part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III” (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
751 (1984))).  Even in a so-called “preenforcement” challenge, where the government has not yet 
applied the law to anyone, the plaintiff must prove that the law threatens her with an “imminent” 
injury.  Id. at 564 (holding that a plaintiff must prove that there has been an injury, or that injury is 
imminent, to have standing). 
 100 Raising the unconstitutionality of a law as a defense in an enforcement action is perhaps the arche-
typal setting for a constitutional challenge.  See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 163 (1908) (“It has 
been suggested that the proper way to test the constitutionality of the act is to disobey it, at least 
once, after which the company might obey the act pending subsequent proceedings to test its va-
lidity.”).  Because this could put challengers “in peril of large loss . . . if it should be finally deter-
mined that the [challenged] act was valid,” however, courts have long recognized a right to sue a 
state preemptively to enjoin the enforcement of an unconstitutional law.  Id. at 165. 
 101 See Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 589 (holding that “the rule for third-party standing requires the named 
plaintiff to have suffered an injury in fact and to share a ‘close’ relationship with third-parties who 
face an obstacle inhibiting them from bringing the claim on their own behalf.” (citing Kowalski v. 
Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004))).  The fact that the doctors in Abbott could avoid criminal pen-
alties by complying with the statute, for example, does not defeat their standing, because compli-
ance would require the expenditure of time and money and, in some cases, would require not per-
forming abortions at all.  See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113 (1976) (“If the physicians prevail 
in their suit [to invalidate an abortion restriction,] they will benefit, for they will then receive pay-
ment for the abortions.”). 
 102 The fact that the provisions imposed no legal obligations directly on them would not defeat their 
standing.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124 (1973) (noting there was “little dispute” that “a 
pregnant single woman thwarted by [ ] Texas[’s] criminal abortion laws[ ] had standing to chal-
lenge those statutes.”).  
 103 See, e.g., H.B. 2, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Tex. 2013) (prohibiting abortions after twenty weeks, 
subject to certain exceptions, and regulating the distribution of “abortion-inducing drugs”); id. § 5 
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whether these laws impose such obstacles as to be unconstitutional, but ra-
ther whether they impose any obstacle at all, this requirement would quickly 
reduce to requiring the plaintiffs to challenge nearly all of the enactment.  
Thus, it would not differ meaningfully from Justice Alito’s approach, and it 
should be rejected for similar reasons. 
2.  The Breakdown of the Transactional Approach 
So far, this Part’s attempts to define a plaintiff’s constitutional claim 
around a “natural grouping” of facts that are “related in time, space, origin, 
and motivation” have resulted in transactions that are both over- and under-
inclusive of claim preclusion’s basic rationales.  Both the enactment-as-trans-
action and injury-as-transaction theories could easily bar later challenges to 
potentially unrelated statutory provisions, while at the same time allowing 
later challenges to related provisions.104  Have we simply failed to identify the 
correct transaction?  Or is there a more fundamental reason that the trans-
actional approach is incompatible with challenges to statutes? 
The genius of the transactional approach is that in most civil litigation, 
the facts that a plaintiff must prove to prevail on her claim form part of a 
larger factual narrative involving real-world interactions between the plaintiff 
and the defendant.105  Thus, instead of evaluating the relatedness of two civil 
claims by directly comparing the evidence or legal arguments required to 
sustain them, courts today can approximate the relatedness of two claims by 
asking whether they “arise out of” a common factual narrative.106  If they do, 
then it is safe to assume they would entail sufficiently similar evidence and 
legal argument to justify preclusion. 
Challenges to statutes are different.  For one thing, not all constitutional chal-
lenges require the plaintiff to prove facts in order to prevail; many constitutional 
doctrines simply ask a court to use its tools of statutory interpretation to deter-
mine whether a statute is valid.107  In such cases, any “transaction” will have little 
to do with the substance of the plaintiff’s challenge, because a transaction is a 
grouping of facts, and facts are not relevant to the merits of such challenges. 
	
(imposing additional reporting requirements on abortion providers); id. § 6 (providing for the revo-
cation of a doctor’s occupational license for failure to comply with § 3); id. § 9 (providing that noth-
ing in H.B. 2 should be construed as repealing “any other provision of Texas law regulating or 
restricting abortion not specifically addressed by this Act.”). 
 104 See generally supra Part II.A.1. 
 105 See, e.g., WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 4, § 4407, at 175–76 (“Matters with a common 
historic origin ordinarily form a convenient package for joint litigation.”). 
 106  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 426.10(c) (West 2017) (defining “related cause[s] of action” as 
those that “arise[ ] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occur-
rences”).  
 107 See infra Part III.B.2 
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Moreover, even when a plaintiff must prove facts to prevail on a constitu-
tional challenge, those facts usually pertain to the characteristics of the chal-
lenged statute rather than to interactions between the plaintiff and the defend-
ant government entity.  For example, some constitutional doctrines require 
proof of a statute’s effects; others require proof of the legislature’s motive in 
enacting the statute; and still others require proof of the law’s relationship to 
its aims.108  Thus, any real-world transaction between the plaintiff and the 
government defendant will poorly approximate the substantive relatedness of 
whatever constitutional claims that “arise” out of that transaction. 
In sum, in interpreting Hellerstedt and crafting rules of claim preclusion in 
its wake, courts should look beyond the Restatement’s transactional ap-
proach and consider more creative ways of measuring the relatedness of sep-
arate statutory provisions.  Indeed, Hellerstedt itself specifies several such met-
rics.  The majority looked to the substantive and linguistic characteristics of 
the admitting-privileges and surgical-center provisions, noting that they were 
“distinct,” that their requirements were “independent,” and that their pur-
poses were “different.”109  To formulate these observations into a workable 
claim-preclusion rule, however, it is first necessary to shed the transactional 
approach applied by the Fifth Circuit and by Justice Alito in his dissent.  
3.  Coda: Does Claim Preclusion Matter in Constitutional Challenges? 
As we have seen, the “transactional” theory of claim preclusion is a poor 
fit for challenges to statutes.  But even if this is so, should courts really spend 
valuable judicial resources developing new rules of claim preclusion?  In 
other words, if claim preclusion is seldom of consequence in challenges to 
statutes, wouldn’t it be more efficient to continue applying the existing rules 
and simply accept that in a very narrow set of cases, they will produce unde-
sirable results? 
Ultimately, the answer is no.  To see why, however, we need to examine 
the objection more closely.  The objection proceeds as follows: Because claim 
preclusion only ever applies in later litigation between the same two par-
ties,110 even if an application of claim preclusion unjustifiably barred a plain-
tiff from mounting a constitutional challenge, some other plaintiff could always 
mount that same challenge in a later action.111  This is particularly true if the 
	
 108 See generally Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 97; see also infra Part III.B. 
 109 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2308 (2016). 
 110 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGEMENTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (explaining that under 
claim-preclusion doctrine, “[a] valid and final personal judgment is conclusive between the parties” 
(emphasis added)). 
 111 Nor would the doctrine of issue preclusion prevent the second plaintiff from asserting a new chal-
lenge that involves the same factual or legal issues as the first, because issue preclusion can only be 
asserted against a party to the original action.  See id. § 27 (stating the general rule that “[w]hen an 
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constitutional challenge was orchestrated by an impact-litigation firm like the 
American Civil Liberties Union, which could easily find a new plaintiff to 
challenge any statute that claim preclusion might bar the same plaintiff from 
challenging.  Similarly, the court’s interest in efficiency and the government’s 
interest in repose are mostly illusory, because even if the government prevails 
in a challenge brought by one plaintiff, another plaintiff could always mount 
that same challenge in a later action.112  Thus, even if the two “transactional” 
theories are imperfect, why not adopt one of them anyway, safe in the 
knowledge that claim preclusion is rarely dispositive in challenges to statutes? 
There are at least two responses to this argument.  First, it overlooks the 
various scenarios in which a new plaintiff is not likely to assert whatever con-
stitutional challenges the prior plaintiff forfeited in her first action.  For exam-
ple, it could be the case that most or all of the eligible plaintiffs joined together 
in the first action.113  Or the first action could have been brought on behalf of 
a class, such that the judgment was binding on all eligible plaintiffs even if they 
were not joined as parties.114  The challenged statute could also target a vul-
nerable minority, such as a religious or ethnic group, or even a relatively pow-
erful minority, such as a small group of the nation’s largest banks115 or the 
	
issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the de-
termination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action 
between the parties.” (emphasis added)); id. § 29 (providing for non-mutual issue preclusion, but only 
against “[a] party precluded from relitigating an issue with an opposing party, in accordance with 
§§ 27 and 28 [which provide certain exceptions not relevant here]”). 
 112 Theoretically, the second plaintiff could assert the exact same claim as the first plaintiff, so long as 
her challenge was not foreclosed by precedent.  This could be the case, for example, if the first 
plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged a statute in district court and took no appeal. 
 113  See FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (allowing plaintiffs to join together in an action if “they assert any right to 
relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and if “any question of law or fact common to 
all plaintiffs will arise in the action”).  Indeed, why should claim preclusion discourage plaintiffs 
from joining together to challenge a law that they believe is unconstitutional?  The enactment-as-
transaction theory would create an incentive for some plaintiffs to “hang back” in case the group 
later wanted to bring a challenge to a different provision of the same statute.  This kind of games-
manship serves neither constitutional nor procedural values. 
 114 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3) (“Whether or not favorable to the class, the judgment in a class action 
must . . . include and describe those whom the court finds to be class members.”). 
 115 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 165, 124 Stat. 1376, 1423 (2010) (authorizing regulators to “establish prudential standards for 
[financial institutions] with total consolidated assets equal to or greater than $50,000,000,000 that 
[ ] are more stringent than the standards and requirements applicable to [financial institutions] 
that . . . do not present similar risks to the financial stability of the United States”); 12 C.F.R. 
§§ 217.402–.403 (2017) (requiring “global systemically important [financial institutions]” to hold 
additional capital reserves); Federal Reserve Board Approves Final Rule Requiring the Largest, Most Systemi-
cally Important U.S. Bank Holding Companies to Further Strengthen Their Capital Positions, BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS. (July 20, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20150720a.htm (identifying eight U.S. banks as “global systemati-
cally important [financial institutions]”). 
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political parties within a state.116  Similarly, the statute could be invalid in only 
a narrow set of applications, or the prior plaintiff could be one of relatively 
few individuals who believe that the law violates the Constitution.  In such 
cases, the eligible challengers could quickly run out, particularly if the statute 
in question is large or complex.  Thus, an overbroad rule of claim preclusion 
could insulate provisions of the statute from judicial review entirely. 
Second, even if other challengers are available, it does not follow that 
courts should disregard a prior plaintiff’s interest in asserting later constitu-
tional challenges.  Indeed, there are good reasons why an individual or an 
organization may want to be “the” plaintiff who asserts a challenge.  For one 
thing, the plaintiff in a constitutional case is entitled to exercise a degree of 
control over the litigation strategy in that case, which can in turn shape the 
court’s ultimate constitutional holding.117  There may also be reputational or 
psychic benefits to being the plaintiff who successfully obtains the invalida-
tion of an unconstitutional statute.118  Rather than impose a harsh forfeiture 
rule on the theory that someone else will come along and vindicate the plain-
tiff’s constitutional rights, courts should provide clear ex ante guidance on 
what claims a plaintiff stands to forfeit by failing to assert them in her first 
action.  An overbroad “transactional” theory of claim preclusion would 
needlessly deprive both individual and organizational plaintiffs of their enti-
tlement to assert constitutional challenges, and would require those plaintiffs 
to expend time and financial resources searching for someone else to assert 
the challenges that they had been unfairly barred from asserting. 
Similar arguments counsel against adopting a too-narrow rule of claim pre-
clusion, or abolishing claim preclusion in constitutional challenges entirely.  
Again, a court might adopt such a rule on the theory that because a new plaintiff 
can always assert whatever challenges a prior plaintiff has forfeited, plaintiffs and 
their lawyers can impose the very efficiency and repose costs that claim preclu-
sion seeks to avoid by interposing new plaintiffs, regardless of how robust a the-
ory of claim preclusion courts adopt.  In practice, therefore, claim preclusion is 
pointless in constitutional challenges, and courts should not bother with it. 
	
 116 See Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 177 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1357–59 (D. Utah 2016) (holding the Utah 
Republican Party’s constitutional challenge of a state statute was not barred by claim preclusion).  
 117 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2016) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by 
a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the client 
as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”). 
 118 Indeed, in many constitutional challenges, impact-litigation firms sue in their own names rather 
than recruiting individual plaintiffs.  See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458–59 (1958) 
(holding that the NAACP had standing to bring a suit to protect the constitutional rights of its 
members); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982) (recognizing that an 
organization has standing to challenge conduct which results in a “concrete and demonstrable in-
jury to the organization’s activities” and a “consequent drain on the organization’s resources”). 
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But again, in some cases, a prior plaintiff will not be able to locate a new 
challenger, either because there are none, or because the costs of locating one 
are prohibitive.119  Moreover, claim preclusion is about setting ex ante incentives 
for plaintiffs: If a plaintiff and her lawyers know that the plaintiff will forfeit her 
right to challenge Provision A of a statute by not including it in her pending 
lawsuit against Provision B of that statute (or that at the very least, if they decide 
to challenge Provision A later, they will have to find a new plaintiff), they will 
think twice before deciding not to challenge Provision A.  Though it might not 
protect the finality of judgments as completely as existing claim-preclusion 
rules for ordinary civil litigation, such a rule would encourage more appropri-
ately sized, and therefore more efficient, constitutional litigation. 
Despite first appearances, therefore, claim preclusion matters in consti-
tutional challenges.  Courts should not settle for a poorly fitting approach 
simply because to do so would be the easiest course of action.  Fortunately, 
moreover, courts are not bound to apply the transactional approach.120  Ra-
ther, because claim preclusion is a judge-made doctrine rooted in federal and 
state common law, courts are free to formulate new claim-preclusion rules 
where the old ones cease to function. 
B.  Constructing a New Approach 
Having established that the transactional approach is inconsistent with both 
Hellerstedt and the broader aims of claim preclusion in constitutional challenges 
to statutes, the task remains to formulate a new approach to take its place.  This 
will require stepping back and considering from a more theoretical perspective 
	
 119 For example, the civil-rights attorneys who argued Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which 
invalidated a Texas law criminalizing sodomy, had difficulty finding a plaintiff, because state sod-
omy laws were rarely enforced.  Dahlia Lithwick, Extreme Makeover: The Story Behind the Story of Law-
rence v. Texas, NEW YORKER (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/03/ 
12/extreme-makeover-dahlia-lithwick. 
 120 See Semtek Int’l v. Lockheed Martin, 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001) (holding that the judgment of a 
federal court sitting in diversity is subject to the state’s claim-preclusion rules); WRIGHT, MILLER 
& COOPER, supra note 4, § 4403, at 17, 29, 38 (“The judge-made character of res judicata doctrine 
reflects the role of res judicata in regulating relationships between successive judicial or quasi-judi-
cial proceedings. . . . Res judicata is very much a common-law subject.  Federal statutes . . . [and] 
[c]onstitutional theory ha[ve] provided little . . . direction.”).  Critically, Hellerstedt itself never 
adopted the transactional approach for constitutional adjudication.  See Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2305 (2016) (discussing the Second Restatement but never expressly 
applying the transactional approach); id. at 2308 (criticizing the Court of Appeals’ application of 
the transactional approach); id. at 2332 (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for failing to 
identify with greater specificity the method it used to determine whether the plaintiffs’ claims were 
“the same”).  This is especially notable given the Court’s acknowledgement of the Fifth Circuit’s 
express reliance on that approach in the proceedings below.  Id. at 2307 (quoting Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 581 (5th Cir. 2015)). 
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the optimal structure of res judicata doctrine—what Professors Robert Casad 
and Kevin Clermont call the “jurisprudence of rules and exceptions.”121 
Casad and Clermont begin by grouping res judicata’s underlying policy 
concerns into three categories: efficiency, fairness, and substantive policies.122  
As Casad and Clermont are careful to note, the policy considerations in each 
category can point in different directions.  Most efficiency concerns (such as 
the desire to avoid inconsistent decisions, to prevent duplicative litigation, or 
to promote repose) counsel in favor of preclusion, although some (such as the 
costs of administering res judicata doctrine itself) cut the other way.123  By 
contrast, fairness concerns (such as the unfairness of deciding an issue on a 
procedural technicality) generally counsel against preclusion, although some-
times these too cut the other way (for example, when the party being pre-
cluded has sought to harass the other party with repetitious litigation).124  
Substantive policies can tip the balance either way in a specific area of the 
law, such as real estate transactions (where res judicata should be 
“fierce . . . to promote an efficient market”) or attorney-client relations 
(where res judicata should be “wary” about allowing lawyers to escape liabil-
ity to clients through procedural technicalities).125  Casad and Clermont then 
posit a simple formula: Because res judicata is fundamentally a policy-driven 
doctrine, in any given case, “[t]he law should preclude what our society sees 
as a person’s normal right to seek adjudication” only where the balance of 
policy concerns “pushing for preclusion” outweighs the balance of factors 
“cutting the other way.”126  
It follows from this formula that res judicata doctrine should be structured 
in a way that guides courts to the proper balance of policy factors in the great-
est number of individual cases.  Thus, Casad and Clermont argue, the doc-
trine should consist of a few “[c]lear, rigid, and simple” rules that “approxi-
mate” the balance of res judicata’s competing policies “over the run of past 
and future cases.”127  Then, because no rule can perfectly balance the factors 
in every case, the doctrine should provide exceptions for specific situations 
where, “in an individual case before a court” that technically falls within the 
rule, the balance of policies nonetheless tips against preclusion.128  These ex-
	
 121 CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 16, at 39–45. 
 122 Id. at 29–38. 
 123 Id. at 31–34. 
 124 Id. at 32–34. 
 125 Id. at 35. 
 126 Id. at 36. 
 127 Id. at 36, 40. 
 128 Id. at 36, 41. 
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ceptions should be “small in scope, even if necessarily considerable in num-
ber,” and should also be more flexible—even “ad hoc”—so that courts can 
exercise greater discretion where the danger of unfairness is especially high.129 
The transactional approach to claim preclusion provides a good example 
of Casad and Clermont’s method.  Its prima facie rule—that one claim pre-
cludes another if the two arise out of the same factual transaction—is clear, 
simple, and sufficient to resolve the majority of cases to which it applies.130  
It is also tempered by a number of exceptions, which identify situations where 
a plaintiff might have a good reason not to assert one claim along with an-
other even though the two arise out of the same transaction.131  In this way, 
the transactional approach first focuses the court’s attention on a simple 
question designed to dispose of most cases, and then provides a list of excep-
tions to address the few cases in which the simple, rigid rule misses the mark. 
1.  Hellerstedt’s Rule for Claim Preclusion in Challenges to Statutes 
To determine whether Hellerstedt announces a claim-preclusion rule that 
fits within Casad and Clermont’s broader framework for res judicata doc-
trine, it is first necessary to determine exactly what Hellerstedt holds.  Although 
a cursory reading of the Court’s opinion might suggest that a challenge to 
one provision of a statute is seldom (if ever) the same “claim” as a challenge 
to a different provision, a closer reading demonstrates that this is not quite 
what the opinion says.  
In its discussion of the “meaningful differences”132 that made the abor-
tion providers’ challenge to the admitting-privileges provision a different 
“claim” than their challenge to the surgical-center provision, the Hellerstedt 
Court repeatedly fell just short of holding that claim preclusion never applies 
between challenges to two different provisions of a statute.  For example, 
after observing that “[t]he surgical-center provision and the admitting-privi-
leges provision are separate, distinct provisions of H.B. 2,” the Court went 
on to note that they also “set forth two different, independent requirements with 
different enforcement dates.”133  It continued: “This Court has never suggested 
	
 129  Id. at 41.  Whether to phrase a particular principle as a rule or exception should turn on how many 
cases will be affected by the principle, how much complexity the principle will introduce into the 
existing doctrine, how much discretion the principle calls for, as well as other concerns that attend 
the formulation of rules and exceptions in other areas of the law—such as which party ought to 
bear the burden of persuasion. 
 130 See id. at 62–66 (summarizing approaches to claim preclusion in U.S. jurisdictions).  
 131 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (setting out exceptions 
to the general rule of bar); id. § 26 (setting out several “exceptions to the rule against claim splitting”). 
 132  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2308 (2016). 
 133 Id. (emphasis added). 
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that challenges to two different statutory provisions that serve two different func-
tions must be brought in a single suit.  And lower courts normally treat chal-
lenges to distinct regulatory requirements as separate claims, even when they 
are part of one overarching government regulatory scheme.”134 
With these qualifications, the Court left open the possibility that two pro-
visions that lack the “meaningful differences” present in Hellerstedt—i.e., two 
provisions that take effect simultaneously, impose “dependent” require-
ments, serve the same “function,” and so forth—might have to be challenged 
together in one action.  Indeed, as a leading treatise acknowledges:  
The only safe general statement [after Hellerstedt] is that it is not always 
appropriate to treat the entire statute as the same transac-
tion . . . . Several complex federal statutes were offered [in Hellerstedt] 
to illustrate the advantages of permitting separate actions.  It remains 
to be seen how far this decision will be generalized. . . . [O]ther cases 
may involve simpler statutes, with closely interlocked provisions that 
seem inseparably linked in the facts and the theory of attack.135 
In such cases, Hellerstedt was careful to allow, claim preclusion may still have 
a role to play. 
And why shouldn’t it?  The efficiency and fairness concerns that claim 
preclusion protects are at their highest when two provisions of a statute are 
closely related.  Challenges to such provisions are likely to involve similar 
legal and factual issues, and hearing them in separate actions would run the 
risk of redundancy and unharmonious or even conflicting decisions.136  It 
could allow a plaintiff to file intentionally vexatious litigation—for example, 
piecemeal suits that delay the implementation of a statutory scheme by chal-
lenging its multiple, interlocking provisions in separate actions.137  And alt-
hough we should perhaps not be too sympathetic to a government official 
tasked with defending an allegedly unconstitutional law, a complete lack of 
claim preclusion would allow a plaintiff to assert in later actions challenges 
that the government might have justifiably expected to have been asserted in 
an earlier one.138 
	
 134 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 135  WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 4, § 4408, at 224–25 (footnote omitted). 
 136  See supra note 119 and accompanying text (arguing against a too-narrow rule of claim preclusion).  
 137  Cf. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2308 (arguing that too broad a rule would encourage a plaintiff to chal-
lenge the entirety of statutes like these in a single lawsuit).  In theory, a well-funded impact-litigation 
firm could achieve the same result by finding separate plaintiffs to challenge separate provisions of 
such a statute, and even a robust rule of claim preclusion could not prevent such a tactic.  But not 
all constitutional challenges are brought by impact-litigation firms, and the costs of having to find 
a new plaintiff would discourage firms from pursuing such tactics.  
 138  True, because claim preclusion ordinarily applies only between the two parties to a prior lawsuit, 
no definition of a plaintiff’s claim—no matter how expansive—can prevent a different plaintiff from 
later challenging a law related to one challenged in an earlier action.  The repose interest at issue 
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Thus, both a close reading of Hellerstedt’s language and an analysis of 
claim preclusion’s policies suggest that Hellerstedt should be read as setting 
forth a narrow prima facie rule: Where a plaintiff has challenged a statutory 
provision in a prior action, claim preclusion bars only a later challenge to a 
closely related provision of the same statute.139  Two statutory provisions are 
closely related when they lack the “meaningful differences” recited in Heller-
stedt—that is, when they take effect simultaneously, impose logically depend-
ent requirements, and serve similar functions.  As they do when applying the 
transactional approach, courts should evaluate these differences “pragmati-
cally,” with an eye to whether the two challenges “form a convenient trial 
unit” and whether they conform to the parties’ reasonable expectations.140 
What sort of claims would fall within this rule?  Suppose that your state’s 
hypothetical gun-control statute contained the following provision: 
Section 1. Registration of firearms. 
(a) Any person who owns or possesses a firearm shall register that firearm 
with the Bureau of Firearms pursuant to regulations promulgated by that 
Bureau.  A fee of $500 shall be assessed for each firearm registered under 
this subsection.  
(b) If a person fails to register a firearm as required by subsection (a) of this 
section: 
(1) The person shall surrender to the Bureau all firearms in his or her 
possession; and  
(2) It shall be an offense for the person to possess any firearm for a period 
of five years after the date of the forfeiture required by paragraph 
(1) of this subsection.  
Suppose further that you, the owner of several unregistered firearms, file a 
lawsuit challenging subsection (a) of this section (the “registration provision”) 
but not subsection (b) (the “failure-to-register” provision).  You argue that the 
registration provision’s $500 fee violates the Second Amendment because it 
burdens your ability to possess a firearm and because it is not supported by a 
sufficiently weighty state interest.141  You lose.  Can you now file a second ac-
tion challenging the penalties provided for failure to register in subsection (b)? 
	
here, therefore, is not repose as to all later challenges to a statute, but rather a narrower sense of 
repose as to later challenges by the same plaintiff. 
 139  It is worth noting that even if Hellerstedt did eliminate claim preclusion for constitutional challenges 
to statutes, the question of whether this was the right decision would still be a live one.  Like all of 
res judicata, claim preclusion is a common-law doctrine; thus, although the Supreme Court can 
authoritatively establish the content of the doctrine as a matter of federal common law, it is up to 
the courts of the several states whether to follow its lead.  Moreover, because Hellerstedt is federal 
common law, Congress could always override it by statute—which it might do if the Supreme 
Court’s approach were largely rejected by other jurisdictions.  
 140  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGEMENTS § 24(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1982). 
 141  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding a ban on handgun possession in 
the home to be a violation of the Second Amendment); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 
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 Under the reading of Hellerstedt that I have advanced so far, the answer 
should be no.  None of the “meaningful differences” between the admitting-
privileges and surgical-center provisions which rendered the plaintiffs’ chal-
lenges to those provisions different “claims” in Hellerstedt are present here.  
Though subsections (a) and (b) are certainly “distinct,” they serve the same 
“function”: To encourage the registration of firearms within the state.  And 
far from imposing “independent requirements,” the requirements imposed 
by subsections (a) and (b) are logically dependent on one another: The pen-
alties in subsection (b) are triggered only when the registration requirement 
imposed by subsection (a) is violated.  Section 1 is a “simpler statute[ ], with 
closely interlocked provisions that seem inseparably linked in the facts and 
the theory of attack,” and claim preclusion should require that it be chal-
lenged all at once in a single action.142  
2.  Hellerstedt and the Jurisprudence of Rules and Exceptions 
This is all well and good as a simple matter of interpreting the language 
used in the Court’s opinion.  But what about Casad and Clermont’s broader 
framework for res judicata doctrine?  Under the reading I have proposed, 
Hellerstedt sets forth a special rule for constitutional challenges to statutes that 
is significantly narrower than the rule prescribed by the transactional ap-
proach for ordinary civil litigation.  Can Casad and Clermont’s framework 
account for this difference?  In other words, is there some reason that, on bal-
ance, claim preclusion ought to apply less frequently in constitutional chal-
lenges than in other kinds of litigation?  
Res judicata’s procedural concerns—efficiency and fairness—account for 
some of the difference.  On balance, these concerns weigh somewhat more 
heavily against preclusion in constitutional challenges than in ordinary civil 
litigation.  For example, the unfairness of denying the plaintiff an adjudica-
tion on the merits will often be more pressing where a plaintiff seeks to vin-
dicate a constitutional right rather than a statutory or common law right, 
although courts should be careful not to assume that constitutional rights are 
ipso facto more important than rights drawn from other sources.143  Likewise, 
although in some cases the desire to avoid repetitive litigation or inconsistent 
decisions will support reviewing two provisions of the same statute together, 
this will not always be the case, as different provisions of a statute will often 
	
U.S. 742 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment applies to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 142  See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 4, § 4408, at 225. 
 143  Plenty of important rights—such as the right to be compensated for grave bodily injury or the right 
to continue living in one’s home—derive from common law or statutes, rather than constitutional 
law.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 789.3 (West 2017) (prohibiting a landlord from evicting a tenant 
by cutting off utilities, locking the tenant out, or removing the tenant’s personal property). 
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suffer from different constitutional infirmities which, in turn, require consid-
eration of different legal issues and proof of different facts.144  Moreover, as 
the Hellerstedt Court noted, the inefficiency of encouraging a “kitchen sink” 
approach to litigation counsels in favor of a narrow rule, although this con-
cern is perhaps equally pressing in ordinary civil litigation.145  Finally, the 
government’s interest in repose is somewhat narrower in constitutional chal-
lenges than in ordinary civil litigation, because unlike in an ordinary civil 
case, a different plaintiff can always assert in a later suit whatever constitutional 
challenges the first plaintiff omitted in the prior suit.146  Thus, the only “re-
pose” claim preclusion can really offer in a constitutional challenge is repose 
with respect to a particular plaintiff. 
In sum, the difference in the balance of procedural policies can only ac-
count for some of the difference in breadth between the transactional ap-
proach and Hellerstedt’s rule for constitutional challenges.  One category of 
claim-preclusion policies remains: Do any substantive policies account for the 
difference between the two rules? 
Here, I think the answer is yes.  Both Hellerstedt and the Restatement en-
dorse a strong general policy in favor of adjudicating constitutional issues on 
the merits,147 and this policy is most pronounced when a plaintiff challenges 
an allegedly unconstitutional provision of a statute.  Several aspects of this 
type of constitutional adjudication make it more deserving of merits review, 
on balance, than ordinary civil litigation.  For one thing, as already noted, the 
interests protected by constitutional rights are often—although not always—
simply more important to individuals than statutory or common-law rights.  
Moreover, unlike most statutory and common-law rights, constitutional rights 
	
 144  See infra Part IV (discussing the need to relitigate when a holding is foreseeable from the first case 
but not proven therein). 
 145 See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2308 (2016) (noting that precluding 
subsequent challenges to other provisions of the same statute “would  encourage  a  kitchen-sink  
approach  to  any  litigation  challenging the  validity  of  statutes[,] [an] outcome  [that] is less  than  
optimal—not  only  for  litigants, but for courts”).  
 146  See supra notes 110–112.  Indeed, even if the second plaintiff sought to challenge the very same law 
as the first plaintiff, the judgment in the first action would only bind the parties in the second action 
through the doctrines of precedent and stare decisis, not issue or claim preclusion.  
 147  See, e.g., Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2305–06 (agreeing with the Restatement that when a claim involves 
“important human values,” such as a woman’s right to seek an abortion or a prisoner’s right to drink 
uncontaminated water, “even a slight change of circumstances may afford a sufficient basis for con-
cluding that a second action may be brought.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 cmt. 
e (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (stating that when “inequities in the implementation of a constitutional 
scheme may result from inflexible application of the rules of merger and bar,” and when “such ineq-
uities involve important ongoing social or political relationships, a second action should be allowed 
even if the claim set forth is not viewed as different from that presented in the initial proceeding”). 
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ordinarily constrain the conduct of government actors rather than private indi-
viduals.148  Because a legal rule promulgated by a government actor (a statute, 
regulation, or the like) almost always applies to more than one person, when 
a court declines to adjudicate a person’s claim that such a rule is invalid on 
claim preclusion grounds, it declines not only to adjudicate that person’s rights 
because of a prior procedural misstep, but also the rights of all persons affected 
by the statute—most of whom had nothing to do with the prior litigation.  
To put the point another way, consider two competing accounts of the 
function of the judicial branch that scholars have identified in different strains 
of the Supreme Court’s justiciability jurisprudence.  On the one hand is Chief 
Justice John Marshall’s famous statement in Marbury v. Madison that it is “em-
phatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is.”149  This statement captures the essence of the “law-declaration” model of 
the federal judiciary—the idea that “federal courts (and especially the Supreme 
Court) have a special function of enforcing the rule of law.”150  On the other 
hand are the Supreme Court’s repeated pronouncements that “its law decla-
ration power [is] incidental to its responsibility to resolve concrete disputes.”151  
This strain—the “dispute-resolution” model—surfaces in the Court’s discus-
sion of justiciability doctrines like standing, mootness, and ripeness and of other 
doctrines that similarly concern the scope of the judicial power.152  As scholars 
have noted, though the Court’s more recent statements regarding the judici-
ary’s role have tended to align with the dispute-resolution model, various doc-
trinal developments in the past several decades can seemingly be explained 
only by the Court’s concern for its law-declaration function.153 
	
 148  Of course, this is somewhat of a generalization.  Some provisions of the Constitution operate di-
rectly on individuals.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend XIII, § 1 (prohibiting “slavery” and “involuntary 
servitude”).  And some statutory rights operate against government officials.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb-1 (2012) (“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even 
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability . . . [unless] it demonstrates that application 
of the burden to the person . . . is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and . . . is 
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”).  Because we are 
designing a rule of claim preclusion, however, generalizations are permissible, as the goal is simply 
to “approximate” the balance of claim preclusion’s policies over the “run of past and future cases.”  
CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 16, at 36, 40. 
 149  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 150 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART 
AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 73 (6th ed. 2009). 
 151 Id.  Indeed, even Marbury recognized this limitation in the less-quoted sentence following its pro-
nouncement of the “province and duty of the judicial department”: “Those who apply the rule to 
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”  Marbury, 5 US. at 177. 
 152  Examples include the “constitutional avoidance” doctrine, see, for example, Clark v. Martinez, 543 
U.S. 371 (2005); “independent and adequate state-law grounds” doctrine, see, for example, Mich-
igan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); and the abstention doctrines, see, for example, Colo. River 
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
 153 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 150, at 75 (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New 
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When a person files a civil action alleging that a provision of a statute 
violates the Constitution, she invokes primarily the court’s law-declaration 
power.  True, she may have previously been subject to the law, and as we 
have already noted, she must at least face a threat of “imminent” harm to 
establish her Article III standing.154  But this requirement is not so difficult to 
satisfy so long as the challenger falls within the class of persons whose conduct 
is regulated by the statute (and even, in some cases, when she does not); thus, 
there need not be a live “dispute” between the government and the chal-
lenger in the sense that the challenger has actually been sanctioned under the 
allegedly invalid law.155  When a court declines to hear a constitutional chal-
lenge to a statute on claim preclusion grounds, therefore, it declines to per-
form its law-declaration function—a function which is itself sufficiently 
weighty to tip the balance of claim preclusion’s policies starkly against pre-
clusion.  Thus, Hellerstedt is best explained as a decision that recognizes—
albeit without explicitly saying so—that law declaration is an important func-
tion that the law should preserve and protect.   
To summarize: Although Hellerstedt requires a rejection of the transac-
tional approach to claim preclusion for challenges to statutes, it can still be 
understood within Casad and Clermont’s general framework for claim pre-
clusion doctrine.  Its prima facie rule is “clear, rigid, and simple”: Two chal-
lenges are not the same “claim” unless they target closely related provisions 
of the same statute.  The narrowness of this rule reflects the unique balance 
of policy concerns in constitutional challenges to statutes, where a strong sub-
stantive policy favors courts fulfilling their law-declaration function.  To-
gether with the somewhat more equivocal balance of res judicata’s proce-
dural policies, this policy counsels against preclusion in constitutional 
challenges to statutes.  
3.  Exceptions: The Restatement and Beyond 
As discussed above, Hellerstedt announces an especially narrow prima fa-
cie rule for claim preclusion in constitutional challenges.  Nonetheless, there 
still may be specific cases that fall within the rule—that is, cases where a 
plaintiff asserts successive challenges to similar provisions of the same stat-
ute—where the balance of fairness and efficiency concerns counsels against 
preclusion.  For example, the Restatement suggests that exceptions be made 
	
Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1779–800 (1991)) (point-
ing to, among others, the doctrine of harmless error and the mootness exception for cases “capable 
of repetition yet evading review” as forming “a substantial body of case law . . . in which adjudica-
tion functions more as a vehicle for the pronouncement of norms than for the resolution of partic-
ular disputes”).  
 154 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 155 See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
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in cases where the first claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, improper 
venue, or failure to join a required party;156 where the plaintiff voluntarily 
dismissed her action or the court dismissed the action without prejudice;157 
where the parties agreed that the plaintiff could challenge two provisions of 
a statute in separate actions;158 where the prior court stated that its judgment 
would not preclude a later challenge to the second provision;159 where the 
plaintiff could not assert the second challenge because of a limitation on the 
prior court’s jurisdiction;160 or where “[i]t is clearly and convincingly shown 
that the policies favoring preclusion of a second action are overcome for an 
extraordinary reason, such as the apparent invalidity of a continuing re-
straint.”161  These exceptions have served courts well in adjudicating claim-
preclusion issues in ordinary civil cases, and there is no reason to reject them 
for constitutional challenges to statutes. 
 One final exception advanced by the Restatement applies specifically to 
constitutional claims.  It holds that claim preclusion does not apply where 
“[t]he judgment in the first action was plainly inconsistent with the fair and 
equitable implementation of a statutory or constitutional scheme, or it is the 
sense of the scheme that the plaintiff should be permitted to split his 
claim.”162  In relevant part, this exception applies where “inequities in the 
implementation of a constitutional scheme may result from inflexible appli-
cation of the rules of merger and bar, especially when there is a change of 
law after the initial decision,” and where “[s]uch inequities involve important 
ongoing social or political relationships.”163  Though this exception applies 
“especially” where there has been an intervening change in constitutional 
law, by its terms, it can apply whenever “important ongoing social or political 
relationships” are implicated by a constitutional ruling.164   
	
156 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1982). 
157 Id. § 20(1)(b). 
158 Id. § 26(1)(a). 
159 Id. § 26(1)(b). 
160 Id. § 26(1)(c). 
161 Id. § 26(1)(f).  This exception applies in cases where, for example, “the question at issue is the validity 
of a continuing restraint or condition having a vital relation to personal liberty,” such as “civil 
commitment of the mentally ill” or “the custody of a child.”  Id. § 26 cmt. i.  To take advantage of 
it, the plaintiff “must apply to the court that rendered the first judgment for a decision as to whether 
a second action is maintainable.”  Id. § 26 cmt. k. 
 162 Id. § 26(1)(d). 
 163 Id. § 26 cmt. e.  
 164 Id.  The Restatement gives the example of a group of black parents and students who sue to enjoin 
the enforcement of a state “tuition grant” law that the plaintiffs allege “fosters racial discrimina-
tion.”  Id. § 26 cmt. e, illus. 6.  The plaintiffs lose their first action; thereafter, the Supreme Court 
strikes down a similar law enacted by a different state.  “Whether or not the claims in the two 
actions by [the plaintiffs] are regarded as the same,” the Restatement holds, “the second action is 
not barred by the first judgment,” because “[i]n a matter of such public importance the policy of 
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The trouble with this exception should be clear from Part I’s discussion of 
the sparring majority and dissenting opinions in Hellerstedt: Who’s to say which 
“social and political relationships” are sufficiently “important” to avoid the 
application of claim preclusion?  Justice Alito highlighted this concern in his 
dissent when he accused the majority of “disregard[ing]” the claim-preclusion 
rules “that apply in regular cases” to reach the merits of “this abortion 
case.”165  And in a separate dissent, Justice Thomas went even further:  
Our law is now so riddled with special exceptions for special rights that our 
decisions deliver neither predictability nor the promise of a judiciary bound 
by the rule of law. . . . Unless the Court abides by one set of rules to adjudi-
cate constitutional rights, it will continue reducing constitutional law to pol-
icy-driven value judgments until the last shreds of its legitimacy disappear.166 
Keep in mind that the issue in Hellerstedt was whether to extend claim 
preclusion’s prima facie rule to bar the plaintiffs’ claims—can you imagine 
the back-and-forth that would have resulted had the Justices been asked to 
decide whether the plaintiffs’ patients’ abortion rights were sufficiently “im-
portant” to allow for an exception to claim preclusion? 
 The flexible exception proposed by the Restatement might be a virtue in 
ordinary civil litigation,167 and it might even provide needed flexibility in cases 
where a plaintiff brings a constitutional challenge to a specific government 
action.168  But as Hellerstedt shows, when judges are called upon to evaluate in 
the abstract the “importance” of conduct regulated by a statute and allegedly 
protected by the Constitution, they have little to anchor their analysis other 
than their own political beliefs.  That is not to say that judges are incapable of 
putting aside their political beliefs to decide cases on the facts and the law; no 
doubt, they are.  But they are also human beings, and asking them to decide 
	
nationwide adherence to the authoritative constitutional interpretation overcomes the policies sup-
porting the law of res judicata.”  Id. 
 165 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2330 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 166  Id. at 2321, 2330 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 167 In such cases, courts are ordinarily called upon to draw inferences from statutory schemes.  The 
Restatement gives the example of a landlord who institutes summary eviction proceedings against 
a tenant, and then later sues the tenant for unpaid rent.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 
§ 26 cmt. e, illus. 5 (AM LAW INST. 1982).  According to the Restatement, “[t]he [second] action is 
not precluded if, for example, the statutory system discloses a purpose to give the landlord a choice 
between, on the one hand, an action with expedited procedure to reclaim possession which does 
not preclude and may be followed by a regular action for rent, and, on the other hand, a regular 
action combining the two demands.”  Id.  
 168 In such cases, at least, judges can consider the gravity of an alleged constitutional violation in a 
particular case.  Thus, a judge who generally favors strong Eighth Amendment protections might 
conclude that in a particular case brought by a prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the violations 
alleged are insufficiently serious to warrant an exception. 
	
Dec. 2017] IDENTITY CRISIS 405 
whether the abstract interests implicated by a politically-charged constitu-
tional challenge are sufficiently “important” to warrant an exception to an 
otherwise-applicable procedural rule is simply asking too much.169   
But if the Restatement’s catch-all exception for constitutional claims 
shouldn’t be read to ask judges to evaluate the “importance” of the issues at 
stake where a plaintiff seeks to challenge different provisions of a statute in sep-
arate actions, at least where there has been no intervening change in the law,170 
what is the basis for the exception?  Should it be rejected entirely, or can it be 
salvaged to apply in other situations where it might be the “sense” of a consti-
tutional “scheme” that a plaintiff “should be permitted to split his claim”?  
Answering this question will require a careful analysis of the nature of the 
“schemes” in question—that is, the structure (as opposed to the substance) of 
constitutional law.  Part III addresses this problem by drawing on two lines 
of scholarship relating to the structure of constitutional challenges and con-
stitutional doctrine: First, the doctrine of facial and as-applied challenges; 
and second, one scholar’s taxonomy of the various types of “tests” courts 
have fashioned to implement constitutional law.  From these doctrines, Part 
III seeks to generalize about certain situations where claim preclusion’s poli-
cies tilt predictably against preclusion, even when two provisions are closely 
related and hence fall within Hellerstedt’s prima facie rule.  
	
 169 Another reason not to ask judges to evaluate the “importance” of the “ongoing social or political 
relationships” implicated by a constitutional right is that this “importance” is already accounted for 
in Hellerstedt’s prima facie rule, as discussed above.  See supra Part II.B.2 (“[Hellerstedt’s] prima facie 
rule is ‘clear, rigid, and simple’: Two challenges are not the same ‘claim’ unless they target closely 
related provisions of the same statute.  The narrowness of this rule reflects the unique balance of 
policy concerns in constitutional challenges to statutes, where a strong substantive policy favors 
courts fulfilling their law-declaration function.”).  Of course, to cite this as a reason for stripping 
judges of discretion to evaluate the importance of constitutional rights on a case-by-case basis is to 
embrace a sort of fiction that all constitutional rights are of roughly equal importance.  Surely, this 
is not the case; some rights—such as the Fourteenth Amendment’s proscription on race discrimi-
nation or the First Amendment’s protection of free speech—are plainly more important than, say, 
the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases.  Nonetheless, it is fair to say that 
Hellerstedt’s rule takes account of the importance of constitutional rights, at least in part.  
 170 Where there has been such a change, courts can fairly evaluate the “equities” of barring the plain-
tiff’s claim by evaluating not the importance of the right involved, but rather the magnitude of the 
change in law.  See, e.g., Justice v. Town of Cicero, 827 F. Supp. 2d 835, 839–40 (N.D. Ill. 2011) 
(holding that, under Illinois law, the Supreme Court’s decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), worked “momentous changes 
in important, fundamental constitutional rights” such that a plaintiff who had previously asserted 
an unsuccessful Second Amendment challenge to a town’s business-licensing and firearms-registra-
tion ordinances could challenge the ordinances again in a later action). 
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III.  SUCCESSIVE CHALLENGES TO RELATED PROVISIONS:  
SOME EXCEPTIONS 
A.  A Framework for Recognizing Structural Exceptions to Claim Preclusion 
This Part begins its search for principles to guide the formulation of struc-
tural, rather than substantive, exceptions to claim preclusion in constitutional 
challenges with a doctrine of constitutional law which, like claim preclusion, 
asks courts to consider what part of a statute or statutory provision a plain-
tiff’s challenge truly targets: the doctrine of facial and as-applied challenges.  
Analogies drawn from this doctrine guide the development of specific pro-
posed exceptions later in this Part.  
1.  The Doctrine of Facial and As-Applied Challenges 
One of the perennial questions in constitutional litigation is whether a 
statute should be invalidated facially—that is, as it applies under any circum-
stances—or only as it applies in a specific set of circumstances.  In Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, for example, a Wisconsin statute imposed criminal penalties on any 
parent who failed to send his or her child to school until the child reached 
the age of sixteen.171  On its face, this law did not appear to violate any pro-
vision of the Constitution.172  But when Wisconsin used the statute to prose-
cute Jonas Yoder—an Amish father who refused to send his fourteen- and 
fifteen-year-old children to school because of his religious beliefs, which re-
quired him to engage his children in agricultural work when they turned 
fourteen—the Supreme Court held that it impermissibly interfered with 
Yoder’s First Amendment rights.173 
If the statute was invalid as it applied to the Yoder, was it also invalid as 
applied to other Wisconsin parents?  Common sense would suggest not.  The 
statute was only invalid as applied to Yoder because it interfered with his 
religious beliefs, which were not then (and are not now) commonly held 
among Wisconsin parents.  Thus, it stands to reason that the statute was only 
invalid “as applied” to Yoder and other Amish parents of fourteen- and fif-
teen-year-old children.174 
	
 171 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (introducing the compulsory school attendance law). 
 172 See id. at 213 (“There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for educa-
tion of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education.” 
(citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925))). 
 173 Id. at 234–35. 
 174 Indeed, this was what the Supreme Court held, although it never explicitly called Yoder’s challenge 
an “as-applied” challenge.  Id. at 234 (“[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the State 
from compelling respondents to cause their children to attend formal high school to age 16.” (empha-
sis added)). 
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In United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court codified this intuition with a 
categorical rule: Courts should only invalidate a statute on its face if “no set 
of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”175  This formu-
lation of the doctrine has since been much criticized by scholars, however.  
Professor Michael Dorf has argued that it reflects neither a coherent account 
of the difference between facial and as-applied challenges nor an accurate 
description of the Court’s actual practice.176  Professor Matthew Adler has 
argued that it is founded on the mistaken assumption that “rule-applications 
can be properly described as unconstitutional,” whereas in fact, all constitu-
tional rights are “rights against rules.” 177   Similarly, Professor Nicholas 
Rosenkranz has argued that any challenge to a statute must be facial, because 
a close reading of the grammar of the Constitution’s various provisions re-
veals that courts review not statutes themselves, but rather the congressional 
act of enacting the statute.178 
Scholars have offered too many glosses on Salerno’s no-set-of-circum-
stances test to discuss them all here.179  Thus, I shall focus on one particularly 
salient account advanced by Professor Richard H. Fallon, Jr.180  Professor 
	
 175 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). 
 176 Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 249–51 (1994); 
see also id. at 251–79 (arguing that the Court applies Salerno neither to “underinclusive” statutes, nor 
to statutes that violate the First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine, nor to statutes enacted for an 
impermissible purpose); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction about Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. 
REV. 915, 935–41 (2011) [hereinafter Fallon, Fact and Fiction] (reporting the results of an empirical 
study showing the “near ubiquity” of facial challenges in Supreme Court jurisprudence). 
 177 Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 153–58 (1998). 
 178 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1230–35 (2010).  
He also argued: 
[C]onsider that, at the moment of the law’s making, there has been no enforcement, and 
there are no facts about the application of the statute.  At that moment, there is only the 
text of the statute and the text of the Constitution. . . . [I]f Congress has violated the Con-
stitution at that moment, the violation must inhere in the text of the statute itself. 
  Id. at 1235 (emphasis omitted).  Because Professor Rosenkranz’s account treats a legislative “enact-
ment” as one of the two actions that the Constitution authorizes courts to review (the other being a 
statute’s enforcement by the executive branch), his account fits with the Hellerstedt dissenters’ enact-
ment-as-transaction theory of claim preclusion.  Id. at 1235–40.  If the Constitution authorizes ju-
dicial review of enactments, not statutes, then it makes sense to say that a plaintiff’s “claim” in a 
challenge to a statute encompasses the whole legislative enactment.  See supra Part II.A.1.a. (discuss-
ing the enactment-as-transaction theory advocated by the Hellerstedt dissenters). 
 179 See, e.g., Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. 
U. L. REV. 359 (1998) (distinguishing between an “‘overbreadth facial challenge,’ which predicates 
facial invalidity on some aggregate number of unconstitutional applications of an otherwise valid 
rule of law,” and a “‘valid rule facial challenge,’ which predicates facial invalidity on a constitutional 
defect inhering in the terms of the statute itself, independent of the statute’s application to particular 
cases”); Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 873 (2005) (examin-
ing the application of the doctrine of facial and as-applied challenges to legislation enacted pursuant 
to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment);. 
 180 See generally Fallon, Fact and Fiction, supra note 176; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial 
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Fallon begins by acknowledging that “all challenges to statutes are in an im-
portant sense as-applied,” because “[a] litigant must always maintain that a 
statute cannot lawfully be invoked against her.”181  The question, therefore, 
is whether the challenge is also “facial”: If the court holds that the statute 
cannot validly be applied to the challenger, can the statute later be validly 
applied to anyone else?182  Professor Fallon’s answer to this question proceeds 
in three parts: “reasons,” severability, and ripeness.183 
First and foremost, the answer has to do with the reasons that the court 
held the law invalid in the first action: “If the Supreme Court, in holding a 
statute unenforceable against a particular challenger, gives reasons broad 
enough to indicate that the statute cannot be enforced against anyone else, 
either, then it will effectively have held the statute facially invalid, even if it 
never employs those words.”184 
To explain why this is the case, Professor Fallon argues that repealing 
laws—even invalid ones—is a legislative power that courts do not possess.185  
Rather, when a court “invalidates” a law, it simply declines to apply it to the 
challenger’s case because it is invalid.186  But because a higher court’s reason-
ing is binding on lower courts, when a higher court decides not to apply such 
a law, lower courts are forbidden from applying that law in any later case that 
is factually similar enough to come within the higher court’s reasoning.187  
The doctrine of stare decisis, moreover, generally binds the higher court to its 
reasoning in its prior decision.188  Thus, the invalidation of the statute is  
	
Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2000) [hereinafter Fallon, As-Applied and 
Facial Challenges]. 
 181 Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges, supra note 180, at 1326; see also Fallon, Fact and Fiction, supra 
note 176, at 923 (making the same argument). 
 182 See id. at 924–25 (distinguishing between a “nearly purely as-applied ruling” where a plaintiff “ad-
vance[s] reasons so specifically tied to the facts of her case as to be unique, or nearly unique, to her 
circumstances,” and the more “[t]ypical[ ]” case, in which “the extent to which a ruling is as-applied 
to particular facts will be a matter of degree”). 
 183 Id. at 950. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges, supra note 180, at 1339. 
 186 This authority derives from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803), which forbids courts to 
apply federal statutes that violate the Constitution, and the Supremacy Clause, which forbids courts 
to apply state statutes that violate the Constitution.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitu-
tion . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 187 Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges, supra note 180, at 1339–40. 
 188 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (recognizing that 
“the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over 
time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable” but also that “a different necessity 
would make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error that its 
enforcement was for that very reason doomed”). 
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accomplished de facto through the doctrines of precedent and stare decisis, not 
through any de jure power to strike the statute from the legislative code.189  
Fallon also notes that in many cases, the reasons that a statute is constitu-
tionally invalid will depend on the doctrinal test applied by the court to invali-
date the law.  Certain types of tests—such as the first prong of the Establishment 
Clause test laid down in Lemon v. Kurtzman, which asks whether a law was en-
acted without a “secular purpose”190—identify constitutional defects that nec-
essarily permeate all of a statute’s applications.191  Others, such as the Eighth 
Amendment’s proscription of “cruel and unusual punishment,” provide more 
room for as-applied adjudication.192  Thus, Professor Fallon concludes, there 
are no “trans-substantive rules governing facial challenges”; rather, “the avail-
ability of facial challenges varies on a doctrine-by-doctrine basis” and is a func-
tion of the applicable “substantive tests” of constitutional validity.193 
Of course, doctrine is not the sole determinant of a court’s reasons for 
invalidating a statute.  Even within a given doctrinal framework, a court pos-
sesses wide latitude to rule on broader or narrower grounds.194  In Yoder, for 
	
 189 Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges, supra note 180, at 1339–40.  This picture is not quite complete.  
In many constitutional cases, a plaintiff asks a court not simply to invalidate the application of a 
statute to her, but also to enjoin the application of that statute to her and, in many cases, to others as 
well.  See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2303 (2016) (noting that the 
district court enjoined the enforcement of both the admitting-privileges and surgical-center provi-
sions).  In this sense, courts indeed possess a power that is functionally similar to “remov[ing] a law 
from the statute books.”  Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges, supra note 180, at 1339.  According 
to the Supreme Court, however, the same principles apply.  See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. 
New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328–29 (2006) (“Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional 
flaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the problem.  We prefer, for example, to enjoin only 
the unconstitutional applications of a statute while leaving other applications in force, or to sever its 
problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact.” (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 
17, 20–22 (1960); then citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227–29 (2005))).  
 190 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
 191 See Fallon, Fact and Fiction, supra note 176, at 937 (noting that most statutes that were held as invalid 
under the Establishment Clause failed at least one prong of the Lemon test); see also Dorf, supra note 
176, at 279 (explaining that if a statute serves an impermissible purpose, such as lacking a secular 
purpose under the Lemon test, then the court cannot sever the purpose from the application and 
must find the statute facially invalid); Isserles, supra note 179, at 366 (articulating the concept of an 
overbreadth facial challenge, where a litigant, for whom a law constitutionally applies, argues that 
the court should find the law facially invalid because “applications of the law to parties not before 
the court would be unconstitutional”). 
 192 See Fallon, Fact and Fiction, supra note 176, at 924 (positing as an example of “a nearly purely as-
applied ruling” the case of “a criminal defendant who challenges a statute prescribing life in prison 
without parole as the mandatory penalty for possessing an ounce or more of marijuana and who 
asserts that the statute violates the Eighth Amendment as applied to her because she: (1) was only 
one day over the age of sixteen at the time of the crime, (2) otherwise had no criminal record, (3) 
was an honor student, (4) had been abused by her parents as a child, and (5) purchased the mariju-
ana at the request of and for her father, who gave her the money to do so”). 
 193 Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges, supra note 181, at 1327 (emphasis added). 
 194 See Fallon, Fact and Fiction, supra note 176, at 951–52 (noting that Justices “who disagree about con-
tentious issues will frequently also diverge in their judgments about when the Court should issue 
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example, the Court could have held that under the First Amendment, any 
sincere religious belief can entitle a parent to withhold his children from 
school.  Instead, it expressly limited its holding to beliefs taught by an histor-
ically well-established religion, and disclaimed any application to “group[s] 
claiming to have recently discovered some ‘progressive’ or more enlightened 
process for rearing children for modern life.”195  Thus, were a more “pro-
gressive” parent to invoke Yoder as a defense to a prosecution under Wiscon-
sin’s school-attendance statute, his defense would likely fail.   
The reasons for a law’s invalidity also depend critically on the facts of the 
law’s application to the plaintiff.  Because a law’s applications are not always 
immediately apparent on the face of the law, courts must develop the content 
of the law by applying it to concrete cases—a process which Professor Fallon 
calls “specification.”196  Wisconsin’s school-attendance law, for example, did 
not appear to be constitutionally invalid on its face; rather, its constitutional 
defect was only revealed once Yoder was prosecuted under it.  Facts therefore 
drive the process of specification: They act as probes of a statute’s validity, 
constantly specifying the statute into further applications (or “sub-rules,” to 
use Fallon’s term) and raising the possibility that those new sub-rules are con-
stitutionally invalid. 
The second factor that influences whether a court will invalidate a law 
facially or as-applied is whether the law’s invalid applications can be severed 
from its valid ones.197  Even if a law can be divided into sub-rules, one of 
which is invalid for a reason that does not implicate the others, a court can 
only apply the valid sub-rule if, in a later case involving an application of the 
invalid sub-rule, the future court could sever and invalidate that rule.198  This 
makes sense from a practical standpoint: Otherwise, the future court would 
be bound by the prior court’s holding that the rule as a whole was constitu-
tionally valid, even though parts of it were not.199 
	
broad rulings . . . and when it should stick closely to the facts of the case before it”). 
 195 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972). 
 196 Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges, supra note 181, at 1325 n.31, 1325–26.  Under this view, Yoder 
specified Wisconsin’s school-attendance statute into two sub-rules: “all Amish children must attend 
school until age 16” and “all non-Amish children must attend school until age 16.”  Though in a 
sense, the former sub-rule inhered in the statute from the time of its passage, it was not until Yoder’s 
challenge that the court could evaluate its validity. 
 197 See Fallon, Fact and Fiction, supra note 176, at 953 (explaining that “in the absence of severability, all 
challenges to statutes would necessarily be facial”). 
 198 Id. at 953–54. 
 199 Though scholars seem to agree that a person has a right to have only valid legal rules applied to 
him, they disagree about the source of this right.  Professor Monaghan has proposed that the Con-
stitution protects “a right to be judged in accordance with a constitutionally valid rule of law.”  
Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (1981).  Professor Dorf has located this 
rule in Marbury v. Madison and the Supremacy Clause: “The Constitution does not create, in so 
many words, an individual right to be judged only by a constitutional law,” Dorf argues, “[b]ut [it] 
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The classic example is Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad v. Jackson Vinegar 
Co.200  In that case, a Mississippi statute required railroads to settle claims for 
lost or damaged freight within a set period of time.201  A vinegar manufacturer 
brought an action against a railroad for failing to settle within that period the 
manufacturer’s claim that the railroad had damaged its shipment of vine-
gar.202  Although the railroad conceded that the manufacturer’s claim was 
potentially meritorious, it nonetheless argued that the Mississippi statute was 
unconstitutional because it would also require the railroad to settle frivolous 
claims in violation of the Due Process Clause.203  Without deciding whether 
the obligation to settle frivolous claims would in fact violate due process, the 
Supreme Court upheld the application of the statute to the railroad.204 
Though the Court never said so in its opinion, scholars have rationalized 
this decision ex post as establishing a presumption that a statute’s applications 
are severable from one another.205  Thus, in a future case involving a frivo-
lous claim against a railroad, the Court could always sever the statute into 
two sub-rules—the obligation to settle non-frivolous claims (upheld in Yazoo) 
and the obligation to settle frivolous claims—and invalidate only the latter.  
This avoids the difficulties inherent in applying a partially unconstitutional 
law to resolve a particular case.206 
The final component of Fallon’s account the is ripeness doctrine.  Often, 
Fallon argues, when a doctrinal test requires a court to consider a statute’s 
	
certainly forbids a court from enforcing an unconstitutional law.”  Dorf, supra note 176, at 248; see 
also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“[T]he theory of every such government must 
be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.”).  “In practice, therefore, 
every litigant does have such a right.”  Dorf, supra note 176, at 249. 
 200 226 U.S. 217 (1912). 
 201 Id. at 218. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. at 219. 
 204 Id. at 219–20. 
 205 See HENRY M. HART, JR. ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 162–63 (6th 
ed. 2009) (stating that the holding in Yazoo was dependent on severing invalid applications from the 
valid application “without invalidating the statute as a whole”); see also Dorf, supra note 176, at 249–
51 (interpreting Yazoo in this way and also suggesting that Salerno be read as reaffirming the pre-
sumption that a statute’s invalid applications are severable from its valid ones). 
 206 Many scholars have pointed to severability as the guiding principle in facial and as-applied chal-
lenges.  See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 176, at 251 (arguing that “facial challenge doctrine really boils 
down to severability doctrine combined with institutional limits on the Salerno presumption of sev-
erability”).  Yet Professor Fallon has questioned whether severability principles accurately account 
for the Supreme Court’s practice.  Fallon, Fact and Fiction, supra note 176, at 953–55.  He concludes 
that the Court’s practice is inconsistent at best, but offers five situations in which the Court is likely 
to sever a statute’s invalid applications: (1) where the applications are “unusual or infrequent”; (2) 
where the court “can identify a relatively surgically precise way of curing the defect that an appli-
cable test has identified”; (3) relatedly, where the statute is valid as applied to the challenger and its 
invalid applications can be surgically severed in future cases (as in Yazoo); (4) where severing would 
conform to legislative intent; and (5) where severing does not “feel” legislative.  Id. at 955–58. 
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real-world effects, the Supreme Court will categorically reject a facial chal-
lenge to that statute if its effects are not yet sufficiently clear.207  The fact that 
a statute’s effects are not yet clear, however, simply means that the statute has 
not yet been thoroughly “specified” through case-by-case adjudication; it does 
not mean that it will never be susceptible to a facial challenge.  Thus, Fallon 
posits, many cases in which the Court has categorically held that a facial chal-
lenge to a statute is unavailable are better explained as ripeness cases: A facial 
challenge that seeks to invalidate a law on the basis of too-hypothetical effects 
should be deferred until those effects become sufficiently clear.208 
To summarize Professor Fallon’s view: Under the doctrine of facial and as-
applied challenges, a court must first identify the reason that a challenged stat-
ute fails a given doctrinal test of constitutional validity.209  Then, it must deter-
mine whether that reason implicates the entire statute, or only the statute’s 
application to a circumscribable set of factual circumstances.210  In the former 
case, the law is facially invalid; in the latter, it is only invalid as it applies in 
those particular circumstances (assuming that the statute’s application in those 
circumstances is severable from its applications in other circumstances).211 
2.  Parallels with Claim Preclusion 
Under Professor Fallon’s account, the doctrine of facial and as-applied 
challenges has much in common with claim preclusion in constitutional chal-
lenges to statutes.  It asks a court to identify the applications of a statutory 
provision that are tainted by the reasons given for its invalidity—in other 
words, the applications that the plaintiff ought to have challenged at the outset 
of the lawsuit—and enjoin only those applications.  Claim preclusion per-
forms a complementary function: By encouraging plaintiffs to challenge 
closely related provisions of statutes together in a single action, it discourages 
challenges that are too narrow.  
	
 207 Fallon, Fact and Fiction, supra note 176, at 960. 
 208 Id. at 961–62. 
 209 See supra notes 184–189 and accompanying text. 
 210 Id. 
 211 See supra notes 197–199 and accompanying text.  One of Professor Fallon’s central theses is that the 
courts consistently follow neither the method that he prescribes nor any other discernible method 
for distinguishing between facial and as-applied challenges.  Fallon, Fact and Fiction, supra note 176, 
at 953–55.  But certain Supreme Court precedents suggest that even when a court purports to 
invalidate a law facially, its holding invalidates the statute only insofar as it is invalid for the reasons 
given in the opinion.  See id. at 953 (giving the example of City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), 
where the Supreme Court seemed to hold the Religious Freedom Restoration Act facially uncon-
stitutional, but noting that in subsequent cases, the Court has treated it as invalid “insofar as it 
creates statutory rights against the federal government, rather than the states”).  This follows from 
the principle that an appellate court’s reasoning is only binding to the extent that it is necessary to 
reach the judgment rendered in the case at bar. 
	
Dec. 2017] IDENTITY CRISIS 413 
There are meaningful differences between the two doctrines, of course.  
Whereas the doctrine of facial and as-applied challenges concerns the relief 
to which a plaintiff is entitled in a single action, claim preclusion concerns 
the effect of a prior action on the plaintiff’s rights in a later one.  Claim pre-
clusion applies not just to applications of a single statutory provision (as dis-
cussed later, in Part IV) but also to different provisions of the same statute; 
and claim preclusion operates with ex ante incentives rather than an ex post 
adjustment to the plaintiff’s relief.212  Ultimately, moreover, the two doctrines 
serve different values: Claim preclusion’s efficiency and fairness rationales 
are arguably of a lower order that the separation-of-powers concerns that 
motivate the doctrine of facial and as-applied challenges.  
Nonetheless, the first step in applying either doctrine is similar: The court 
must identify the optimal scope of the plaintiff’s constitutional challenge to 
the provisions of a statute.  In designing exceptions to Hellerstedt’s prima facie 
rule, therefore, it follows that courts might draw lessons from the doctrine of 
facial and as-applied challenges.  For example, Professor Fallon’s account of 
the doctrine teaches that the proper scope of a plaintiff’s challenge to a stat-
utory provision depends at least in part on the reasons proffered for the provi-
sion’s invalidity—that is, characteristics of the provision that the plaintiff 
claims render it invalid under a particular provision of the Constitution.  
Might these “reasons”—which I’ll call the statute’s constitutional “defect”—
not also have a role to play in limiting the scope of claim preclusion in con-
stitutional challenges to statutes?  
Another of Professor Fallon’s key insights is that a constitutional defect 
can apply to some, but not all, of a statutory provision’s applications.  But 
just as a defect can affect more than one application of a provision, one defect 
can also affect different provisions of a statute.  If a legislature enacts a statute 
with the same racially discriminatory intent, for example, that intent can ren-
der all of its provisions invalid.213  Similarly, when two provisions contribute 
to a single unconstitutional effect, that effect can render both statutes uncon-
stitutional.214  If a plaintiff is entitled to challenge no more of a provision’s 
applications than are invalid because of a given defect, does it follow by way of 
analogy that a plaintiff ought to challenge no fewer of a statute’s provisions than 
are implicated by that defect?  Does a defect form a kind of “unit” of litigation 
in constitutional challenges? 
Yes, it does—but because of claim preclusion’s procedural policies, not 
the constitutional values underpinning the doctrine of facial and as-applied 
challenges.  Challenging two provisions of a statute that suffer from the same 
	
 212 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 15 (allowing for amendment of pleadings only by “a party,” not the court). 
 213 See infra notes 255–262 and accompanying text. 
 214 See infra Part III.B.1.a.  
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constitutional defect in separate actions is inefficient, because the court will 
have to consider similar legal and factual issues in the two actions;215 con-
versely, there is little to be gained in terms of efficiency by requiring two 
challenges to provisions that suffer from different defects to be brought to-
gether in one action.  Thus, a single constitutional defect is an efficient unit of 
litigation because it is likely to require argument of a single set of legal issues 
and proof of a single set of facts (if any).  It is true, of course, that wherever 
two provisions that suffer from different constitutional defects also are not 
closely related, claim preclusion will not apply for the independent reason 
that the provisions fall outside of Hellerstedt’s prima facie rule.  But there may 
still be cases where application of Hellerstedt’s rule is overinclusive because two 
related provisions nonetheless suffer from different defects.  
Consider an example.  Suppose that your state’s new gun-control statute 
contains the following provision, which appears just after the registration re-
quirement:  
Section 2. Exceptions to the registration requirement.  
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, a person shall not be re-
quired to pay the registration fee described in section 1 of this title if: 
(a)  The person is a woman who is not married to a man and who resides in 
a city or county with a population density that exceeds 5,000 per square 
mile; or 
(b)  The person demonstrates a severe economic hardship. 
Suppose that you, a male resident of the state, challenge subsection (a) of this 
section (the “unmarried-woman” provision) after your failed challenge to the 
registration requirement in Section 1.  You argue that the unmarried-woman 
provision is an invalid gender classification because it is based on the stereo-
type that women are less capable of defending themselves than men.216  
Though the provisions are “distinct,” they are not “independent,” because 
Section 2(a) is an exception to the requirement imposed by Section 1(a).  
Moreover, the two provisions serve the same “function”—to license persons 
	
 215 Issue preclusion, a related doctrine of res judicata, recognizes this by directly prohibiting the reliti-
gation of previously litigated legal or factual issues.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 
(AM. LAW. INST. 1982).   
 216 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); see also Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 731, 
737 (1984) (recognizing that Matthews, a male applicant for spousal benefits under the Social Se-
curity Act, had standing to challenge a provision of that statute which offset the spousal benefits 
received by certain male applicants, including Matthews, by the amount of any federal or state 
pension received unless the applicant “could demonstrate dependency on their wage-earning wives 
for one-half of their support”—even though Matthews stood to gain no increased benefit because 
the statute elsewhere provided that if the gender classification were held invalid, then female appli-
cants too would have to demonstrate dependency, because “the right asserted by appellee is the 
right to receive ‘benefits . . . distributed according to classifications which do not without sufficient 
justification differentiate among covered [applicants] solely on the basis of sex’” (alterations in orig-
inal) (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 647 (1975))).  
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to possess firearms.  Thus, the provisions are arguably sufficiently related so 
that Hellerstedt would not bar the application of claim preclusion. 
But would it make sense to bar your second claim?  The two provisions 
suffer from very different alleged defects.  In your prior suit, you argued that 
the registration requirement violated the Second Amendment, whereas you 
now claim that the unmarried-woman provision violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  Moreover, the litigation surround-
ing the two challenges would look very different: In the first challenge, you 
would have to prove that $500 is an onerous amount to pay to register a 
firearm and perhaps analogize to cases in other jurisdictions where such re-
quirements had been struck down; in your second challenge, you would have 
to demonstrate (among other things) that the prior law was motivated by ste-
reotypes about a woman’s ability to defend herself, which could involve the 
presentation of statistical or anecdotal evidence or an analysis of the provi-
sion’s legislative history.  Thus, even if you had challenged the two provisions 
together, you would have avoided little if any redundancy.  
As the foregoing example shows, there may be situations where no effi-
ciency gains are made by forcing plaintiffs to challenge related provisions of a 
statute in a single action.  To account for these situations systematically, how-
ever, will require a more thorough analysis of constitutional doctrine.  The 
remainder of this Part proposes a series of categorical exceptions that courts 
can use to resolve claim-preclusion issues that arise under different “tests” of 
constitutional validity.  But first, this Part looks to existing scholarship for a 
rigorous definition of exactly what kind of legal rule a constitutional “test” is.  
B.  The Structure of Constitutional Doctrine 
As many scholars have observed, courts have created a complex infrastruc-
ture of rules—a “code-like sprawl of two-, three-, and four-part tests”217—to 
implement constitutional norms.  The difference between these constitutional 
“doctrines” and the Constitution’s “meaning” has been the subject of sustained 
scholarly attention over the past several decades.  Professor Henry Monaghan, 
for example, distinguished between “constitutional exegesis” and what he 
called “constitutional common law”—a “substructure of substantive, proce-
dural, and remedial rules,” which “draw[ ] their inspiration and authority 
from, but [are] not required by, various constitutional provisions.”218  Simi-
larly, Professor Richard H. Fallon, Jr., has argued that “a gap . . . exists be-
tween the meaning of constitutional norms and the tests by which those norms 
	
 217 Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 97, at 57. 
 218 Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3, 31 (1975).   
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are implemented.”219  Most recently, Professor Mitchell Berman has distin-
guished between what he calls “constitutional operative propositions,” which 
represent the Constitution’s meaning, and “constitutional decision rules,” 
which courts use to decide concrete constitutional cases.220 
Despite their differences in terminology, these analyses all rest on the 
common premise that while determining constitutional meaning is one thing, 
creating constitutional doctrine is something else.  To answer questions of con-
stitutional meaning, courts look to the Constitution’s text, history, original 
public meaning, and so on; to answer questions of constitutional doctrine, 
they look to second-order concerns, like deference to legislatures or courts’ 
own limited competencies.221  As the authoritative interpreter of the Consti-
tution, moreover, the Supreme Court’s determinations of constitutional 
meaning are binding on Congress, while its determinations of constitutional 
doctrine can sometimes be modified by legislation.222 
Take the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause as an exam-
ple.  Under current equal-protection doctrine, a statute may differentiate be-
tween able-bodied people and people with disabilities so long as the govern-
ment can articulate a hypothetical, non-arbitrary justification for doing so.223  
This is not a very high bar.224  Does this mean that the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Constitution’s guarantee of “equal protection of the laws” to 
mean that Congress and the states may discriminate against people with disa-
bilities in any non-arbitrary manner? 
Not necessarily.  Courts review laws that discriminate against people with 
disabilities deferentially not because those people are not deserving of equal 
treatment, but rather because courts have determined that other values—such 
as separation of powers and federalism—preclude them from carefully scrutiniz-
ing each and every legislative enactment that treats similarly situated individuals 
	
 219 Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 97, at 60. 
 220 Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 13 (2004). 
 221 Id. at 93–97 (offering a “provisional catalogue” of these concerns: “minimizing adjudicatory error, 
promoting greater compliance with the constitutional operative proposition, reducing the extent to 
which an operative proposition chills socially valuable conduct, reducing constitutional litigation 
and its associated costs”). 
 222 See id. at 96 (“The Court could permit Congress to substitute its judgment for the Court’s on just 
what the applicable decision rule should be.”); Monaghan, supra note 218, at 28 (explaining that the 
Court’s “use of constitutional common law . . . allows a coordinate role for Congress” to use its 
“special institutional competence” to “protect[ ] constitutional liberties”). 
 223 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985). 
 224 It is not satisfied, for example, if a city enacts a zoning ordinance that entirely excludes homes 
dedicated for occupancy by people with intellectual disabilities.  Id.  A state law providing a lower 
burden of proof to commit people with “mental retardation” than with “mental illnesses,” by con-
trast, passes this standard, because “mental retardation is easier to diagnose than is mental illness,” 
since “mental retardation is a developmental disability that becomes apparent before adulthood.”  
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993). 
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differently.225  Thus, courts engage in searching constitutional review only when 
laws differentiate based on certain “suspect classifications”; in all other cases, 
they defer to the legislative interpretation of the equal-protection norm.226 
Unlike the Constitution’s provisions, most of which are phrased as broad 
prohibitions or guarantees, the doctrinal tests used to implement the Consti-
tution often resemble ordinary civil causes of action.  They consist of ele-
ments, assign burdens of persuasion,227 and in some cases, they even require 
a trial court to make factual findings.228  At the trial level, therefore, some 
challenges to statutes look a lot like ordinary civil litigation: A court might 
hear testimony from witnesses, consider documentary evidence, and then ap-
ply a standard of proof to decide which facts the litigants have or have not 
established.  Although higher courts may debate the legal significance of those 
factual findings on appeal, they are usually bound to accept the findings 
themselves absent a “clear error” by the trial court.229 
	
 225 See id. at 319 (explaining that “a classification . . . no[t] proceeding along suspect lines is accorded 
a strong presumption of validity” because “the judiciary [should not] sit as a superlegislature to 
judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations.” (quoting City of New Orleans 
v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 33 (1976)). 
 226 See id. (holding that deference to “legislative policy determinations” is appropriate when the legisla-
tion does not trammel upon suspect classifications). 
 227 Again, the equal-protection test provides a familiar example: Once a plaintiff has shown that a law 
discriminates on the basis of a protected class, such as race, the burden shifts to the government to 
prove that the law pursues an actual, non-hypothetical end, and that the law’s means are sufficiently 
tailored to that end.  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“We have held that all 
racial classifications imposed by government ‘must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict 
scrutiny.’  This means that such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored 
to further compelling governmental interests.” (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200, 227 (1995))). 
 228 The scholarship that has addressed the role of facts in constitutional adjudication has generally ad-
dressed the empirical methods that courts use to make factual findings.  See David L. Faigman, “Nor-
mative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. 
PA. L. REV. 541, 550 (1991) (“Increasingly, commentators and litigants are checking the modern 
Court’s fact-finding on the basis of empirical research that only sometimes supports, and often con-
tradicts, the Court’s ‘best guesses’ about the world.”); Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role 
of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 657–58 (1988) (examining 
“the emerging importance of facts to constitutional analysis” and advocating “fact-based standards 
of constitutionality” that give “lower court[s] freedom from precedent based on factual findings”).  
 229 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).  At least in the First Amendment context, however, the Supreme Court 
has recognized an exception to this rule: Rule 52 does not bar an appellate court from considering 
whether a party has adduced “clear and convincing” evidence that a statement was made with 
“actual malice” (and thus falls outside the scope of the First Amendment’s speech protections).  See 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 (1984) (“Judges, as expositors of 
the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross 
the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and 
convincing proof of ‘actual malice.’”).  For an argument that this rule should be expanded to other 
constitutional cases, see Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 
238–39 (1985) (arguing that “constitutional fact review at the appellate level is a matter for judicial 
(and legislative) discretion,” which should “respon[d] to important institutional needs,” such as “the 
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Other constitutional tests, by contrast, do not require the parties to prove 
facts.  Instead, they simply ask courts to “lay the article of the Constitution 
which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and decide whether the 
latter squares with the former.”230  Courts decide challenges invoking these 
“legal” tests using their tools of statutory interpretation, rather than their fact-
finding abilities: They look to the statute’s text and other indicators of its mean-
ing to determine whether it violates a higher principle of constitutional law.   
This distinction between factual and legal tests suggests our first claim-
preclusion exception: If a plaintiff challenges two different statutory provi-
sions in two separate actions, and if one challenge invokes a factual test while 
the other invokes a legal test, there is little reason to apply claim preclusion.  
One challenge calls for an analysis of the provision’s text, legislative history, 
and other indicators of statutory meaning, while the other calls for the 
presentation of evidence and testimony.  Thus, regardless of how related 
these two provisions were, few efficiency gains would result from requiring a 
plaintiff to challenge them together in one action. 
When two challenges both invoke legal or factual tests, the claim preclu-
sion question is a closer one.  The remainder of this Part focuses on develop-
ing categorical rules for these situations.  I begin with factual tests, which 
break down into at least four different subtypes: effects tests, means-end tests, 
motive tests, and compound tests. 
1.  Factual Tests 
a.  Effects Tests 
The first type of factual test requires a court to determine the challenged 
statute’s real-world effects.  Some of these tests require the court to measure 
a statute’s burden on the exercise of a right,231 others require the court to 
balance those burdens against the law’s benefits,232 and still others require 
courts to search for some other, more narrowly defined effect.233  Examples 
	
danger of systemic bias of other actors in the judicial system and the need for continuous develop-
ment of constitutional principles on a case-by-case basis”). 
 230 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936). 
 231 See, e.g., Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 97, at 74–75 (giving the example of United 
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968), which requires heightened scrutiny of a law that 
regulates conduct that has both “‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements,” thereby placing “incidental 
limitations on First Amendment freedoms”).  
 232 See Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016) (explaining that the undue-
burden test requires courts to balance a law’s burdens on the right to abortion against its medical 
benefits). 
 233 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (directing courts hearing Establishment 
Clause challenges to ask whether a statute’s “principal or primary effect [is] one that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion”). 
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of “effects” tests include the First Amendment’s test for statutes that regulate 
conduct with speech-like elements,234 the “undue burden” test for statutes 
that regulate abortion,235 and the emerging Second Amendment test for stat-
utes that burden the exercise of gun rights.236  In such challenges, of course, 
the challenged statute’s “defect” is its unconstitutional real-world effect. 
The difficulty with determining whether two laws contribute to the 
“same” unconstitutional effect is that courts can easily reach different con-
clusions depending on the level of generality at which a statute’s effect is de-
fined.  Suppose a state enacts the following hypothetical statute, based on a 
Utah law that was recently the subject of a constitutional challenge.237  A 
state statute provides: 
Balloting of Candidates.  For any political party to list its candidates for elec-
tive office on the state’s general election ballot, the political party must: 
(1) permit voters who are unaffiliated with any political party to vote for the 
political party’s candidates in a primary election; and 
(2) permit a member of the party to seek the party’s nomination for an elec-
tive office by gathering signatures in the amount of 5% of registered vot-
ers who are residents of the legislative district for which the nomination 
is sought and are permitted by the party to vote for the party’s candidates 
in a primary election.238 
Suppose a political party within the state challenges the first provision (the 
“unregistered-voter” provision), but not the second provision (the “signature-
gathering” provision) as an unconstitutional infringement on the party’s First 
Amendment right of association and succeeds.  May the party later bring a 
second challenge to the signature-gathering provision separately? 
	
 234 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (“[W]hen ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same 
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech ele-
ment can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”). 
 235 See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2310 (reiterating the “undue burden” standard developed in prior case 
law). 
 236 Though the Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on the doctrinal test used to evaluate a law 
under the Second Amendment rights recognized in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), 
and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), several courts of appeals have suggested that 
the inquiry is two-fold: First, the court must determine whether the regulated conduct falls outside 
the “historical” scope of the Second Amendment; and second, the court must measure the law’s 
burden on the asserted right, and apply a correspondingly searching degree of judicial scrutiny.  See 
Ezell v. Chicago, 846 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Severe burdens on the core right of armed 
defense require a very strong public-interest justification and a close means-end fit; lesser burdens, 
and burdens on activity lying closer to the margins of the right, are more easily justified.”); see also 
Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960–61 (9th Cir. 2014) (“When ascertaining 
the appropriate level of scrutiny [to apply,] . . . we consider: ‘(1) “how close the law comes to the 
core of the Second Amendment right” and (2) “the severity of the law’s burden on the right.”’” 
(quoting United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013))). 
 237  Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 177 F. Supp. 3d 1343 (D. Utah 2016). 
 238 See id. at 1349, 1357–59 (evaluating the validity of a similar statute enacted by Utah in 2014).  
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Under the reading of Hellerstedt I have proposed, the answer would be no.  
Though the two provisions are “distinct,” their requirements are not “inde-
pendent,” because the number of signatures required for a candidate to satisfy 
the signature-gathering provision depends in part on the number of unregis-
tered voters who, according to the unregistered-voter provision, must be al-
lowed to vote in the party’s primary.  Moreover, the two provisions serve the 
same “function”: to determine whether a political party is qualified to list can-
didates on the state’s election ballot.  Thus, claim preclusion’s prima facie rule 
would apply, and it would be up to the political party to establish that some 
exception to claim preclusion allowed its second challenge to proceed.239 
Under the First Amendment, however, the relevant question is how se-
verely those measures burden the right of a candidate to put her name on 
the ballot.240  Do the provisions impose the “same” burden on ballot access, 
such that there is something to be gained by requiring that they be challenged 
in a single lawsuit? 
This is not an easy question to answer.  In most cases, a statute’s effects 
will be too indeterminate for a court to identify with the degree of precision 
necessary to justify the application of claim preclusion.  At a high enough 
level of generality, any statute that is subject to a challenge under an effects 
test will have the same “effect” as any other such statute, since the legal trig-
ger for such tests is a simply generally phrased effect (like an “undue burden” 
on abortion rights).  Conversely, at a granular enough level of generality, any 
two statutes will have different effects simply by virtue the fact that they im-
pose different legal obligations. 
	
 239  In the actual case, the district court allowed the Utah Republican Party’s challenge to the signature-
gathering provision.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-408 (West 2017).  This was because “the current 
signature gathering concerns raised by [the party] were not ‘previously available’ because they arose 
when the Unaffiliated Voter Provision was struck down [in the first action].”  Cox, 177 F. Supp. 3d 
at 1358.  Though “[t]he ruling in the First Lawsuit did not change the number of signatures required 
[under the signature-gathering provision],” the court explained, “because it excluded unaffiliated 
voters from the [party’s] primary and therefore excluded unaffiliated voters from signing petitions, it 
changed the percentage of signatures a U[tah] R[epublican] P[arty] candidate would be required to 
gather because the pool of eligible signers was reduced.”  Id.  The court also rejected Utah’s reliance 
on the enactment of the election statute as the “transaction” out of which the party’s claims arose:  
While both lawsuits generally arise from the passage of SB54, the passage of a law cannot 
be the “transaction, event or occurrence” that provides the factual commonality between 
the two lawsuits, as the [State] argues.  If that were the rule, only one as-applied challenge 
could ever be brought to challenge a law.  This certainly is not the intended consequence 
of the claim splitting doctrine. 
  Id. at 1361.  
 240 In Burdick v. Takushi, the Court explained: 
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh “the character and 
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward 
by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration 
“the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” 
  504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). 
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One scenario where a court might presume that two statutes contribute 
to the same unconstitutional effect is where the plaintiff challenges the effects 
of two statutes in combination.  For example, suppose that in her second 
challenge, the plaintiff admits that individually, the unregistered-voter provi-
sion and the signature-gathering provision do not sufficiently burden ballot 
access so as to be unconstitutional, but argues that in combination, the two 
provisions amount to a constitutional violation.241  In such a case, the plain-
tiff’s own allegations would amount to an admission that the two provisions 
contributed to a single, unconstitutional effect. 
In all other cases, however, courts are faced with three options: (1) eval-
uate each effects-based challenge on a case-by-case basis; (2) categorically 
presume that the two provisions have the same effect; or (3) categorically 
presume that they have different effects.  The first approach recalls the catch-
all exception for constitutional rulings proposed by the Restatement, and is 
untenable for the same reasons.242  The second option, a categorical pre-
sumption of the same effect, would in effect be to recognize no exception at 
all, which would be unacceptably overbroad.  The best approach, therefore, 
is to categorically presume that two different provisions have different effects, 
unless the plaintiff challenges the two provisions as a combination in her sec-
ond action—in which case, courts should categorically presume that the two 
statutes have the same effect. 
Under this proposed exception, if a plaintiff chooses to challenge one stat-
utory provision in one action, she forfeits the right to challenge that provision 
in combination with any related provision of the same statute in a later ac-
tion.  But if two rules are truly so similar as to have the “same” unconstitu-
tional effect, then the plaintiff’s strongest case will be to challenge those laws 
in combination, since their cumulative effects will presumably be greater 
than either provision’s effect in isolation.  Thus, the proposed rule provides 
an additional incentive for plaintiffs to challenge related statutory require-
ments in one action: If instead the plaintiff chooses to wind her way through 
a statute’s multiple interlocking provisions, losing each challenge because no 
single provision is sufficiently burdensome to rise to the level of a constitu-
tional violation, she will eventually forfeit the right to assert her strongest 
claim—a challenge to the statute as a whole. 
	
 241 See Cox, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 1358 (noting that in the prior suit, a political party argued that “the 
Signature Gathering Provision was unconstitutional because unaffiliated voters’ signatures would 
‘drown out’ the [party’s] voters’ voice . . . [by] ‘having unaffiliated voters signing petitions for [the 
party’s] candidates (candidates who may not subscribe to the [party’s] values and principles)’”). 
 242 See supra notes 162–169 and accompanying text. 
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b.  Means-Ends Tests 
The second group of factual tests require courts to apply various levels of 
judicial “scrutiny” to determine whether a statute’s means are reasonably 
calculated to achieve its legitimate ends.243  The First Amendment’s guaran-
tee of free speech, the Equal Protection Clause, and the fundamental-rights 
analysis under the Due Process Clause are all examples of constitutional pro-
visions that use this device.244  These tests have a two-part structure: First, a 
court must determine which level of scrutiny is triggered.  Second, the court 
must apply that level of scrutiny to the challenged law and decide whether it 
passes constitutional muster. 
The second step of this two-part analysis measures the constitutionality 
of laws by their overinclusiveness with respect to permissible state interests.  
“Strict” (or “intermediate”) judicial scrutiny requires the government to 
prove that the law furthers a “compelling” (or “substantial”) government in-
terest, and that it does not burden the protected right more than is necessary 
(or “sufficient”) to achieve that interest.245  The government must often prove 
facts to carry its burden on both the state-interest and the relatedness prongs 
of the overinclusiveness analysis. 
Consider the case of United States v. Virginia, where the Supreme Court 
considered whether the Virginia Military Institute’s (“VMI”) males-only ad-
missions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause.246   Virginia conceded 
that the policy discriminated against applicants based on their gender, and 
thus triggered “intermediate” scrutiny. 247   VMI’s admissions policy was 
nonetheless constitutional, Virginia argued, because it was “substantially re-
lated” to the “important government objective” of providing “the very as-
pects of [the] program that distinguish [VMI] from . . . other institutions of 
higher education in Virginia,” including its focus on “physical training, the 
absence of privacy, and the adversative approach.”248  Because women’s in-
nate physical characteristics made them unable to function in such an envi-
ronment, there was no less restrictive means of creating that environment 
than excluding women entirely.249 
The United States, as plaintiff, argued not only that VMI’s males-only 
admissions policy treated men and women differently, but also that its means 
	
 243 Fallon calls these “suspect-content” tests.  Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 97, at 68. 
 244 Id. at 88. 
 245 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (reciting the means-ends test under strict 
scrutiny); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996) (stating the required means-ends 
test under intermediate scrutiny). 
 246 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 523. 
 247 Id. at 524–25, 534. 
 248 Id. at 533, 540. 
 249 Id. at 524. 
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(excluding women) were overinclusive of its ends (“to produce educated and 
honorable men” who are “prepared for the varied work of civil life” but also 
“ready as citizen-soldiers to defend their country in time of national peril”).250  
Because “some women can meet the physical standards [VMI] now impose[s] 
on men” and would “do well under [the] adversative model,” the Court ex-
plained, VMI’s “great goal is not substantially advanced by women’s cate-
gorical exclusion.”251  The Court therefore invalidated VMI’s policy.252 
As the VMI case demonstrates, the defect identified by a means-end test 
will usually be unique to a given statutory provision.  Different statutory pro-
visions often advance distinct state interests, and even when two provisions 
advance the same interest, they must necessarily do so by different means—
otherwise, the two provisions would not be meaningfully distinct.  Because a 
mismatch between a provision’s means and its ends is not the kind of defect 
that can pertain to more than one provision, the categorical rule for means-
ends tests should be that a means-ends challenge to one provision does not 
bar any later challenge to any other provision. 
This rule makes sense from an efficiency perspective.  The facts support-
ing the conclusion that a law is sufficiently tailored to a sufficiently weighty 
state interest will ordinarily be different in different challenges.  For example, 
to make its case that VMI’s males-only admissions policy was “substantially 
related” to the asserted “important governmental objective” of training “cit-
izen-soldiers,” Virginia elicited testimony from several experts to the effect 
that “gender-based developmental differences” made it so that “‘[m]ales tend 
to need an atmosphere of adversativeness,’ while ‘[f]emales tend to thrive in 
a cooperative atmosphere.’”253  This fact established the purported relation-
ship between the gender discrimination and the asserted state interest in 
providing “adversative” military education.254  It is difficult to imagine a con-
text in which Virginia could use such testimony to defend against a challenge 
to a different law. 
	
 250 Id. at 521–22. 
 251 Id. at 541–42, 545–46 (alterations in original) (first quoting United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 
896 (4th Cir. 1992); then quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1432 (W.D. Va. 
1991)). 
 252 Id. at 558. 
 253 Id. at 541 (quoting United State v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1434). 
 254 Id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for “reject[ing] (contrary to our established 
practice) the factual findings of two courts below, . . . [including] the finding that there exist ‘gen-
der-based developmental differences’ supporting Virginia’s restriction of the ‘adversative’ method 
to only a men’s institution, and the finding that the all-male composition of the Virginia Military 
Institute (VMI) is essential to that institution’s character”). 
	
424 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:2 
c.  Motive Tests 
A third category consists of doctrinal tests that direct courts to look to the 
motives of the legislature to determine whether a law is valid.255  We have al-
ready discussed one example: the equal-protection test for facially neutral laws.  
Similarly, an abortion regulation imposes an undue burden if its “purpose” is 
to “present[ ] a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.”256   
Another example is the first prong of Lemon v. Kurtzman’s test for violations 
of the Establishment Clause, which holds that a law is invalid if lacks a “secular 
legislative purpose.”257  For example, suppose that a state enacted a statute that 
(1) allows students in public schools a one-minute period for “meditation or 
voluntary prayer” at the beginning of each school day; and (2) permits public-
school teachers to “lead ‘willing students’ in a prescribed prayer to ‘Almighty 
God . . . the Creator and Supreme Judge of the world.’”258  A parent whose 
child participated in a teacher-led prayer challenges only the statute’s second 
provision.  At trial, the parent adduces evidence showing that the statute’s 
sponsor inserted a statement into the legislative record indicating that the leg-
islation was an “‘effort to return voluntary prayer to [the] public schools.”259  
Indeed, the sponsor testifies before the district court that he had “no other pur-
pose in mind” when he introduced the legislation,260 and the government pre-
sents no evidence of any other purpose.261  The court finds that the teacher-
led-prayer provision lacks a secular purpose and strikes it down. 
After prevailing in the first action, could the parent later challenge the 
voluntary-prayer provision under the Establishment Clause?  Not under Hel-
lerstedt.  The two provisions impose dependent requirements—the first pro-
vides for a period of prayer and the second provides that a teacher may lead 
a prayer during that period—and they serve the same function—to encour-
age prayer in school.  This time, however, they also share a constitutional 
defect: Because the voluntary-prayer provision was part of the same enact-
ment as the teacher-led-prayer provision, the legislature’s unconstitutional 
motive—the enactment’s constitutional defect—implicates both provisions.  
These provisions should have been challenged together in the same lawsuit. 
Parsing a legislature’s motive in enacting a statute can be a daunting task.  
Statutes are often the result of political compromises between legislators, and 
	
 255 These include Professor Fallon’s “aim” tests, “purpose” tests, and “appropriate-deliberation” tests.  
Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 97, at 70–73.  See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Con-
stitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523 (2016). 
 256 Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016). 
 257 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
 258 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985). 
 259 Id. at 43. 
 260 Id. at 57. 
 261 Id. at 59, 61. 
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different provisions of a statute could share a general purpose while serving 
more specific and distinct individual purposes.262  Nevertheless, constitu-
tional doctrine still largely assumes that legislatures act with a unitary pur-
pose when they enact laws.263  When addressing claim-preclusion issues, 
therefore, courts should categorically presume that two statutory provisions 
were enacted with the same motive if they were enacted by the same legisla-
ture at the same time.  This rule also squares with claim preclusion’s effi-
ciency rationale, because the evidence required to prove an unconstitutional 
legislative motive—such as committee reports or floor debates—usually per-
tains to an entire enactment, not its individual provisions. 
2.  Legal Tests 
The final category consists of constitutional tests that require proof of no 
facts.  These tests include the Due Process Clause’s void-for-vagueness test;264 
the Supremacy Clause’s preemption test;265 separation-of-powers tests, like 
the nondelegation doctrine266 and the Presentment Clause;267 and federalism 
tests, like the anticommandeering doctrine268 and the limits on Congress’s 
powers under the Commerce Clause.269  Indeed, tests requiring proof of no 
	
 262 See N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 216–18 (4th Cir. 2016) (explain-
ing that the legislature considered separate race-based data specific to each of the provisions of the 
voting law). 
 263 See Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 97, at 537 (stating that the Supreme Court often 
believes the legislature’s intentions are in line with the intention of the legislator who proposed or 
supported a law). 
 264 See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402–03 (2010) (explaining a penal statute is not vague 
when the statute “define[s] the criminal offense [1] with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people 
can understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983))). 
 265 See Altria Grp. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76–77 (2008) (explaining that when a statute which may 
preempt state law has two possible readings, courts will use the reading that avoids preemption). 
 266 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–73 (2001) (describing that “[i]n a delega-
tion challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated legislative power to 
the agency.”). 
 267 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436–40 (1998) (determining that although a presi-
dent, when presented with a bill that has passed both houses of Congress, can either accept the law 
or reject it, the president may not reject only parts of the bill as a “line item veto”). 
 268 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–22 (1997) (rejecting the federal government’s plan to 
have state-level sheriffs run background checks for a federal firearms law because the federal gov-
ernment cannot command state officials to act). 
 269 See Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (holding that Congress can regulate three 
categories of activities under the Commerce Clause: (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) instru-
ments of interstate commerce, even if they are used exclusively for intrastate activities; and (3) ac-
tivities with “a substantial relation to interstate commerce”); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 607–09 (2000) (reaffirming that Congress’s Commerce Clause power is limited to the 
categories articulated in Lopez). 
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facts probably constitute the majority of the doctrinal tests discussed in most 
first-year classes on constitutional law. 
If a defect does not depend on a statute’s factual properties, then it must 
depend on its “legal” properties—that is, characteristics of the statute that 
the court can ascertain using only its tools of statutory construction.  Because 
such a defect inheres in the language of a statute, two statutes could only have 
the “same” legal defect if they had the same language—in other words, if 
they were the same statute.  Thus, challenges identifying this kind of defect 
should have no claim preclusive effect other than to bar a later challenge to 
the same application of the same statute. 
For example, suppose that a plaintiff challenges a provision of a federal 
statute that prohibits the growing of marijuana for the grower’s own private, 
noncommercial use.  This statute, the plaintiff argues, is invalid because it 
falls outside the scope of Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause and 
is authorized by no other Article I power.270  Applying the existing test for 
Commerce Clause challenges, the court rules against the plaintiff, holding 
that Congress could rationally conclude that growing marijuana “substan-
tially affects” commerce.271 
Suppose the plaintiff then asserts a second Commerce Clause challenge, 
this time to a different provision of the statute, which prohibits the transfer of 
marijuana whose growth is prohibited in the prior provision within a state.  
Although these two provisions serve similar functions and impose dependent 
requirements—the transfer prohibition applies only to the type of marijuana 
specified in the growth provision—they do not suffer from the same defect: 
The defect alleged in the first challenge was that growing marijuana within a 
state did not “substantially affect” interstate commerce, while the defect alleged 
in the second challenge was that transferring marijuana within a state does not.  
Indeed, the only way that these two statutes could suffer from the same defect 
would be if they regulated the same conduct—that is, if they were identical. 
This result makes sense from the perspective of claim preclusion’s ration-
ales.  When a plaintiff challenges a law under a purely legal test, there can be 
no danger that she will later ask the court to rehear testimony or reexamine 
evidence in a second challenge.  And although the government would prob-
ably prefer not to defend against two challenges identifying legal defects in 
separate lawsuits, it is difficult to articulate an objective basis for the expec-
tation that two such challenges ought to be brought together in a single ac-
	
 270 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5–9 (2005). 
 271 Id. at 20–22. 
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tion.  Finally, if this exception seems too permissive, recall that issue preclu-
sion would prevent a plaintiff from relitigating any issues that she had already 
litigated in a prior challenge to a different statute.272 
IV.  SUCCESSIVE CHALLENGES TO THE SAME PROVISION 
Parts I and II focused on the central question of when two challenges to 
two different provisions of a statute are the “same” claim for purposes of 
claim preclusion.  But the Supreme Court in Hellerstedt also addressed a sec-
ond question: When, if ever, can a plaintiff assert two challenges to the same 
provision in separate actions?  
In some ways, this latter question is the more significant of the two.  
Though it may have fewer theoretical implications for claim preclusion doc-
trine, it arises more frequently in practice, where courts are often asked to 
determine the claim preclusive effect of a plaintiff’s failure to challenge a stat-
utory provision in a prior proceeding against the same government entity.  
Jurisdictions are split on whether claim preclusion bars a constitutional chal-
lenge where a plaintiff failed to raise the invalidity of the challenged statutory 
provision as a defense in a prior civil, criminal, or administrative proceed-
ing,273 and at least one lower court has addressed the claim-preclusive effect 
	
 272 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW. INST. 1982) (discussing the relation-
ship between claim and issue preclusion where the prior challenge was factual). 
 273  See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 851 F.3d 746, 748 (7th Circ. 
2017) (holding that under Illinois’s transactional approach to claim preclusion, plaintiff employee’s 
failure to assert in a state-court administrative appeal a First Amendment challenge to a provision 
of an Illinois labor law, which required payment of union dues by nonmember employees, barred 
later facial challenge to that provision, because the plaintiff’s “First Amendment claim and his ear-
lier Illinois statutory claim [to be allowed to pay his dues to a charity rather than the union, as 
expressly provided by statute] arise from the same fact: the existence of an Illinois law requiring 
that he pay fees to the Teamsters, the union required to bargain on his behalf”); Willhauck v. Hal-
pin, 953 F.2d 689, 705 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that under Massachusetts “same cause of action” 
approach, plaintiff’s failure to assert in a prior criminal prosecution against him a Fourth Amend-
ment challenge to a Massachusetts law that “makes it an offense for a person operating a motor 
vehicle to refuse to stop when signaled to stop by a police officer” barred his later facial challenge 
and as-applied challenges to that provision).  But see Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 952–53 
(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that under California’s “primary right” approach, plaintiff’s failure to assert 
a First Amendment challenge to a state outdoor-advertising statute in a prior nuisance proceeding, 
brought against plaintiff by the state agency responsible for enforcing the statute, did not bar plain-
tiff’s challenge in a later civil action); Stanton v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 78–80 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (noting that under D.C.’s transactional approach, plaintiff lawyer’s failure to raise in a 
prior suspension proceedings constitutional challenges to D.C. Court of Appeals regulations gov-
erning the appointment of members to the D.C. Professional Responsibility Board and the judicial 
review of orders of that board did not bar his later facial challenge to those regulations, because his 
later facial challenge concerned “post-judgment events”—namely, the application of the regula-
tions to a future proceeding); Griffin v. Alabama, No. 3:16-cv-00480-MHH, 2017 WL 372310, at 
*2 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 26, 2017) (concluding that under Alabama’s transactional approach, a plaintiff’s 
failure to assert in a prior criminal proceedings a First Amendment challenge to a state obscenity 
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of a plaintiff’s failure to challenge a statute’s constitutionality in a prior civil 
suit concerning only the proper interpretation of the statute.274  Given its po-
tential implications for these questions, this second aspect of Hellerstedt also 
warrants careful attention. 
By way of review, the Hellerstedt Court held that during the period be-
tween the plaintiffs’ preenforcement facial challenge and their postenforce-
ment as-applied challenge to the admitting-privileges provision, “concrete 
factual developments” that were “unknowable before [the provision] went 
into effect” had occurred.275  Specifically, the Court explained, abortion pro-
viders at the two Texas clinics had actually been unable to obtain admitting 
privileges—a result the Fifth Circuit had doubted when it rejected the plain-
tiffs’ prior facial challenge to the provision—and as a result, the two clinics 
would soon have to close down.276  Thus, the Court held, the two challenges 
to the admitting-privileges provision were not the “very same claim,” and 
claim preclusion did not bar the plaintiffs’ second challenge.277  
Though this result makes intuitive sense, its implicit premise—that two 
challenges to the same statutory provision are not necessarily the same 
“claim” for claim-preclusion purposes—may seem a bit quixotic at first.  But 
it begins to make sense when viewed in light of Part II’s discussion of claim 
preclusion’s competing policy rationales.278  Where a statutory provision’s 
constitutional defect manifests only after the conclusion of a prior challenge, 
even if the plaintiff could have predicted the defect in the prior suit (as did the 
Hellerstedt plaintiffs), they could not have proven it at that time, so relitigation 
raises little risk of redundant or inconsistent factual findings (even if there may 
be some overlap in the legal arguments).  Moreover, a contrary rule would 
create a dilemma for plaintiffs: It would force them to choose between gam-
bling on a preenforcement challenge—in which a statute’s adverse effects 
would be more difficult to prove but could be prevented before they occur—
	
statute did not bar his later facial challenge to that statute, because “the facts germane to [the facial 
challenge] d[id] not share a common nucleus with those underlying [the plaintiff’s] conviction”—
whereas the criminal action required “resolv[ing] factual issues related to whether [plaintiff] know-
ingly possessed obscene material,” the facial challenge “concerned only . . . whether [the statute] 
places an unconstitutional restriction on free speech”).  
 274  See Pittston Co. v. United States, 199 F.3d 694, 704–05 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that under the 
federal transactional approach, a coal company’s prior lawsuit challenging the secretary of labor’s 
method of calculating the premium to be paid by the company under the Coal Industry Retiree 
Health Benefit Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776, 3036 (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. §§ 9701–22 (2012)), did not bar the company’s later challenge to the premium requirement 
under the Constitution’s nondelegation and separation-of-powers doctrines). 
 275  Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2306 (2016). 
 276  Id. 
 277  Id. at 2307. 
 278  See supra Part II.B. (discussing res judicata’s underlying concerns of efficiency, fairness, and substan-
tive policies).  
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and opting for a postenforcement challenge—in which the adverse effects (if 
any) will be more readily apparent, but where the damage to constitutionally 
protected interests (again, if any) will have already been done.  From a fairness 
perspective, imposing such a dilemma would be unacceptable. 
Somewhat more puzzling is the Court’s decision to phrase its “changed 
circumstances” holding as a rule of claim preclusion—recall that the Court 
concluded that the plaintiffs’ two challenges were not the “very same claim”—
rather than an exception.  The Court could have recognized a clear and sim-
ple rule that two challenges to the same statutory provision are the same claim, 
but then recognized an exception for when intervening factual developments 
demonstrate that the provision in fact suffers from a defect that was previously 
insufficiently apparent to sustain a constitutional challenge.  Though the dis-
tinction is perhaps academic—even Casad and Clermont acknowledge that 
“any distinction between rules and exceptions would seem to have a shaky 
foundation”279—such a formulation might have been more intuitive.  
Likely, the Court’s contrary choice is best explained as an analogy to a 
comment in the Restatement, which states that “[m]aterial operative facts 
occurring after the decision of an action with respect to the same subject 
matter may in themselves, or taken in conjunction with the antecedent facts, 
comprise a transaction which may be made the basis of a second action not 
precluded by the first.”280  But whereas it makes sense to say that a new fac-
tual predicate forms a new “claim” under the transactional approach—
where the facts themselves can form a new transaction—that reasoning 
doesn’t hold in a challenge to a statute, where facts have proven to be a less 
useful tool for defining the boundaries of a plaintiff’s claim.  Indeed, an ex-
ception for intervening factual developments would align with the Restate-
ment’s existing exception for intervening changes in the law.281  Thus, alt-
hough Hellerstedt binds the federal courts in terms of its phrasing of the 
doctrine, state courts might consider adopting a different phrasing as they 
continue to formulate their own claim-preclusion rules.  
Perhaps more importantly, Part III’s analysis also suggests that Heller-
stedt’s rule for intervening factual developments applies not only between a 
prior facial challenge and a subsequent as-applied challenge, but also be-
tween any permutation of prior and subsequent facial and as-applied chal-
lenges.  In Hellerstedt, of course, the plaintiffs’ first challenge was facial, and 
	
 279  Casad & Clermont, supra note 16, at 39. 
 280  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1982). 
 281  See id. § 26(1)(d), cmt. e (recognizing an exception, discussed in detail in Part II.B.3. of this Article, 
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implementation of a statutory or constitutional scheme,” which applies “especially when there is a 
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their second challenge was as-applied.282  Were the situation reversed, how-
ever, the same balancing of claim preclusion’s policies would result: Preclu-
sion would produce few efficiency gains, because the plaintiffs would have to 
show in their second suit that the admitting-privileges provision had in fact 
proven an obstacle for all clinics in Texas, and it would present the same Hob-
son’s choice between a preenforcement and postenforcement challenge.  The 
same goes for successive facial challenges or successive as-applied challenges 
to the same provision.  Indeed, at least one court of appeals has suggested in 
dicta that, at least in successive as-applied challenges to one provision, the 
second claim ought not be barred.283 
The same logic holds for successive challenges to two different facial or as-
applied defects.  Hellerstedt does not foreclose the applicability of claim pre-
clusion where a plaintiff challenges the same defect with the same provision 
of the same statute in two successive actions—that is, where the claims in the 
two actions are literally the same.284  Nor does it foreclose the applicability of 
claim preclusion to a subsequent challenge to a different defect that was none-
theless apparent at the time of the prior suit.  Such a challenge would repre-
sent an attempt to sue a second time on a different “theor[y] of the case,” 
and so should be barred.285  But Hellerstedt does suggest that, for the reasons 
given above, where the second challenge identifies a defect that was “un-
knowable” at the time of the first suit, it represents a new claim not precluded 
by the first challenge.286  
One final insight, drawing on Part III’s structural analysis of constitu-
tional doctrine, is that new constitutional claims will ordinarily not arise un-
der Hellerstedt’s rule for intervening factual developments where the basis of 
the second challenge is a motive test or a purely legal test.  This is because all 
of the evidence needed to adjudicate such challenges—the text of the statute 
	
 282  Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2304–05. 
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itself, its legislative history, statements made by its sponsors, and so on—will 
be apparent at the time of the statute’s enactment, and the plaintiff’s failure 
to discover any such evidence that was in existence at the time of the prior suit 
will not give rise to a new claim.287  As a practical matter, therefore, the rule 
is most relevant for effects tests—as in Hellerstedt itself, where an “undue bur-
den” on abortion rights became apparent between the two lawsuits—or 
means-ends tests, where advances in technology, business practices, or other 
factual changes could render a particular regulation no longer the least re-
strictive means of furthering a state interest. 
CONCLUSION 
As Casad and Clermont note, “Res judicata presents a truly classic strug-
gle between the need for clear, simple, and rigid law and the desire for its 
sensitive application.”288  Nowhere is this struggle more pronounced than in 
the application of claim preclusion to constitutional challenges to statutes.  
On the one hand, the need for “sensitive application” of procedural rules is 
accentuated in constitutional challenges, where the rights at stake are of ut-
most importance not just to the litigants, but to the public at large.  On the 
other hand, the exercise of traditional equitable discretion in these cases in-
evitably creates the appearance—if not the reality—of political partisanship.  
In cases like Hellerstedt, abstract questions about the importance of fundamen-
tal constitutional rights test the limits of judges’ abilities to set aside their po-
litical beliefs and decide cases on just the facts and the law.  
Difficult though they may be, these issues are only likely to recur in the 
coming years.289  To this end, I have proposed a reading of the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Hellerstedt that both clarifies the application of claim pre-
clusion in constitutional challenges to statutes and explains it in terms of pre-
vailing theories of claim-preclusion doctrine.  
I’ve argued that Hellerstedt recognizes a “clear, rigid, and simple”—albeit 
narrow—prima facie rule: When a plaintiff asserts a challenge to a provision 
of a statute, she must also challenge any other provision of that statute that is 
closely related—that is, any provision that takes effect at the same time, im-
poses logically dependent requirements, and serves the same function.  Like 
all claim-preclusion rules, however, Hellerstedt’s rule should be tempered by 
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exceptions for particular cases that fall within the rule but where the balance 
of claim preclusion’s competing policies nonetheless weighs against preclu-
sion.  Because flexible exceptions are especially likely to create the appear-
ance, if not the reality, of political partisanship in constitutional challenges to 
statutes, courts should deviate from the ordinary practice of recognizing dis-
cretionary exceptions.  Rather, they should recognize exceptions based on 
the structure of constitutional doctrine, which is sufficiently predictable to sup-
port broad generalizations about when claim preclusion’s efficiency concerns 
can and cannot be served.  
This structural analysis also helps explain Hellerstedt’s holding regarding 
the second challenge to the admitting-privileges provision, which should be 
understood to apply whenever intervening factual developments reveal a pre-
viously challenged statutory provision to be unconstitutional in ways that 
were not apparent at the time of the prior challenge.  Thus, although Heller-
stedt leaves room for the application of claim preclusion to the “very same 
claim”—that is, two challenges to the same provision of the same statute on 
the same grounds—when a plaintiff challenges in successive actions any com-
bination of facial and as-applied defects with a statutory provision, the second 
action should be allowed if and only if the defect alleged arises out of factual 
developments that were unknowable at the time of the first suit. 
Clear and uniform procedural rules are essential for the judiciary to 
maintain its neutrality in constitutional adjudication—especially in today’s 
political climate, where the need for a neutral judiciary is particularly acute.  
With its elaboration of the claim-preclusion doctrine that should apply in 
constitutional challenges to statutes, this Article takes a step towards estab-
lishing these much-needed procedural rules. 
